

**INVESTIGATING THE ENGAGEMENT OF PRIVATE
SECURITY SERVICES AS A MEANS OF COUNTERING
BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA**

OLUWASEYI MIKE BAMIGBOYE

**IŞIK UNIVERSITY
JUNE, 2023**

INVESTIGATING THE ENGAGEMENT OF
PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES AS A
MEANS OF COUNTERING BOKO
HARAM IN NIGERIA

OLUWASEYI MIKE BAMIGBOYE
Işık University, School of Graduate Studies,
International Relations Master's Program,
2023

This thesis has been submitted to Işık University, Graduate School of Education for a
Master's Degree (MA).

IŞIK UNIVERSITY
2023

IŞIK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUTE STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER PROGRAM

INVESTIGATING THE ENGAGEMENT OF PRIVATE
SECURITY SERVICES AS A MEANS OF COUNTERING
BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

OLUWASEYI MIKE BAMIGBOYE

APPROVED BY:

Prof. Dr. Ödül Celep
(Thesis Supervisor)

Işık University

Doç. Dr. Özlem Kayhan Pusane

Işık University

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi İbrahim Mazlum

Marmara University

APPROVAL DATE: 21.06.2023

INVESTIGATING THE ENGAGEMENT OF PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES AS A MEANS OF COUNTERING BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

ABSTRACT

Despite the efforts of the Nigerian military and other security forces to date, Boko Haram remains a significant threat to the country, and the potential role of private security services in combating this threat is largely unknown. Therefore, it is critical to examine the effectiveness of private security services in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria, focusing on the role of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection Limited (STTEP) and the perceptions and experiences of key stakeholders. Drawing on a qualitative case study methodology, this study thus fills a critical gap in understanding the security landscape in Nigeria by shedding light on the potential role and impact of private security services in the fight against Boko Haram. The study's findings underscore the pivotal role that private security companies can play in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. This is especially true for companies that have counterinsurgency experience in Africa and can gain the trust of local communities. In addition, the study highlights the critical importance of cultural sensitivity, commitment to long-term sustainability, respect for human rights, and strategic alliances to achieve lasting stability and effectiveness in counterterrorism. The study then underscores the compelling need for sound regulations, comprehensive training for personnel, and well-designed strategies specifically for private security companies in Nigeria. These findings are intended to guide policymakers, practitioners, and academics involved in security, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. Applied to a broader context, these findings also hold significant potential for developing more effective strategies in response to security threats, not only in Nigeria but also in other countries facing similar security challenges, underscoring the wider significance of these findings.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Nigeria, Private Security Services, Counterterrorism

NİJERYA'DA BOKO HARAM'I ENGELLEME YÖNTEMİ OLARAK ÖZEL GÜVENLİK HİZMETLERİNİN KULLANIMININ ARAŞTIRILMASI

ÖZET

Bugüne kadar Nijerya ordusu ve diğer güvenlik güçlerinin çabalarına rağmen, Boko Haram ülke için önemli bir tehdit olmaya devam etmektedir ve özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin bu tehditle mücadeledeki potansiyel rolü büyük ölçüde bilinmemektedir. Bu nedenle, özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin Nijerya'daki Boko Haram ile mücadeledeki etkinliğini incelemek, özellikle Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection Limited (STTEP) isimli şirketin rolüne ve ana paydaşların algı ve deneyimlerine odaklanmak kritik önem taşımaktadır. Niteliksel bir durum çalışması metodolojisi kullanan bu çalışma, özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin potansiyel rolü ve Boko Haram ile mücadeledeki etkisi konusunda ışık tutarak Nijerya'daki güvenlik manzarasını anlamadaki kritik bir boşluğu doldurur. Çalışmanın bulguları, özel güvenlik şirketlerinin Nijerya'daki Boko Haram ile mücadelede oynayabileceği hayati rolü vurgular. Bu, özellikle Afrika'da karşı isyan deneyimi olan ve yerel toplulukların güvenini kazanabilen şirketler için geçerlidir. Ayrıca, çalışma, kültürel duyarlılığın, uzun vadeli sürdürülebilirliğe bağlılığın, insan haklarına saygının ve stratejik ittifakların, terörle mücadelede kalıcı istikrar ve etkinliği sağlama konusunda kritik önemini vurgular. Çalışma, daha sonra sağlam düzenlemeler, personel için kapsamlı eğitim ve Nijerya'daki özel güvenlik şirketleri için özellikle tasarlanmış stratejiler ihtiyacını vurgular. Bu bulgular, güvenlik, karşı isyan ve terörle mücadele ile ilgilenen politika yapıcıları, uygulayıcıları ve akademisyenlere rehberlik etmek amacıyla tasarlanmıştır. Daha geniş bir bağlama uygulandığında, bu bulguların, sadece Nijerya'da değil, benzer güvenlik zorluklarıyla karşı karşıya olan diğer ülkelerde de güvenlik tehditlerine karşı daha etkili stratejiler geliştirme potansiyeli vardır, bu da bu bulguların daha geniş anlamını vurgular.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Boko Haram, Nijerya, Özel Güvenlik Hizmetleri, Terörle Mücadele

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful to the many people who have generously supported and encouraged me throughout my life, especially during my master's studies and the writing of this thesis.

First, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Professor Ödül Celep, my supervisor, for his support, encouragement, and insightful critique during this research project. His guidance and advice were crucial to my studies and writing. Second, I would like to express profound gratitude to Associate Professor Özlem Kayhan Pusane and Assistant Professor İbrahim Mazlum. Their insightful feedback and constructive criticism during the thesis defense proved crucial in the final stages of this thesis. I appreciate them not only in their professional capacity but also as people who have greatly enriched my academic journey through their guidance.

I thank Professors John Oluwole Akintayo of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and Omolade Olomola of Cavendish University, Uganda, who have given me unconditional love and support all these years. Thank you both so much. I also thank my family for all they have done for me, especially my wife, Olatomiwa, and my two children, Perez and Johanna. It was a difficult time for them, especially since I could not give them my full attention for many days while I was researching and writing. Their constant support and understanding were a rock for me during that time.

Finally, my parents, Olufemi and Victoria, were a tremendous source of strength and encouragement to me during this process, and I am immensely grateful to them.

OLUWASEYI MIKE BAMIGBOYE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL.....	i
ABSTRACT.....	ii
ÖZET.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATION.....	x
CHAPTER 1.....	1
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Background and Context.....	1
1.2. The Conflict in Nigeria and the Role of Boko Haram.....	2
1.3. The Increasing Use of Private Security Services in Nigeria.....	8
1.4. Research Problem and Objectives.....	14
1.5. Significance of the Study.....	14
1.6. Thesis Outline.....	15
CHAPTER 2.....	17
2. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	17
2.1. Introduction.....	17
2.2. The Evolution of Private Military And Security Companies.....	18
2.3. The Evolution of Warfare And Private Security’s Changing Role.....	19
2.4. Use of Outcome-Based Approach for Security Interventions Evaluation.....	24
CHAPTER 3.....	28
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN.....	28

3.1. Introduction.....	28
3.2. Research Design.....	30
3.3. Case Study Selection.....	31
3.4. Description of the Organization.....	31
3.5. Rationale for Selecting STTEP as the Case Study.....	32
3.6. Data Collection and Analysis Plan.....	33
3.7. Limitations and Restrictions.....	33
CHAPTER 4.....	35
4. RESULTS.....	35
4.1. The Hiring of STTEP by the Nigerian Government to Counter Boko-Haram.....	35
4.2. The Methods and Strategies Employed by STTEP.....	36
4.3. Quantitative Findings from the Global Terrorism Database.....	40
CHAPTER 5.....	46
5. COUNTER-BOKO HARAM: IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITS.....	46
5.1. Interpretation of Results in Relation to Previous Research.....	46
5.2. Private Security Implications in Countering Boko Haram In Nigeria.....	47
5.3. Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research.....	48
CHAPTER 6.....	51
6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION.....	51
6.1. Summary of the Main Findings.....	51
6.2. Recommendations.....	52
REFERENCES.....	55
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	70

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Table of Findings.....	40
Table 4.2: STTEP's impact on Nigerian counterterrorism in data	41
Table 4.3: Reported Boko Haram casualties in January and February 2015.....	42

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
COIN	Counterinsurgency
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
NACTEST	National Counterterrorism Strategy
NAF	Nigerian Armed Forces
PMC	Private Military Company
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company
PSC	Private Security Company
STTEP	Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection Limited.
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Context

The transition of Nigeria, a federal state of about 223 million people in West Africa, from military rule to democracy after about four decades since its independence in 1960, has been overshadowed by an escalating internal security crisis that has caused great concern among the Nigerian government, citizens, and the global community (Onuoha, 2010; Isma'ila & Madu, 2016; World Population Review, 2023). In just a decade criminal violence-including kidnappings, militancy, religious conflict, and armed robbery-has increased at an alarming rate. The most disturbing aspect is the sharp increase in religiously motivated violence, which threatens public order and the security of the people of Nigeria. This disturbing escalation of religious extremism, highlighted by events such as the Sharia conflict in several northern states in 2000 and the Miss World riots in 2002, poses a serious threat to Nigeria's statehood (Onuoha, 2010). Even more troubling, religious conflict claimed more than 10,000 lives in Nigeria between 1999 and 2003, and violent incidents have continued thereafter (Isaacs, 2003). The emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency has further exacerbated the situation and contributed to the growing number of casualties, displacements, and orphanages caused by religious unrest in Nigeria. Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist movement active in northeastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon. The group, whose name "Boko Haram" is derived from Hausa and translates as "Western education is forbidden," rejects Western influence and ideals (Agbiboa and Maiangwa, 2014; Kulungu, 2021). According to Amaechi (2016), Mohammed Yusuf founded the

Salafist movement in 2002 to oppose Western education and promote the formation of an Islamic state in Nigeria. However, the group first gained widespread attention in 2009 when it carried out a series of attacks against government and civilian targets in the northeast of the country (Oriola and Akinola, 2017).

1.2 The Conflict in Nigeria and the Role of Boko Haram

Since the group gained notoriety in 2009 for attacks on the government and civilians while attempting to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, it has committed various acts of violence throughout its history. These include bombings, targeted killings, kidnappings, and attacks on educational institutions, places of worship, and commercial centers. It has also been responsible for the deaths of numerous people, including civilians, military personnel, and politicians (Onuoha and George; 2016, Oriola and Akinola, 2017). Violent incidents such as the bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011, which killed two people and injured many, and the bombing of the headquarters of UN in Abuja in 2011, which killed 23 people and injured over 100, serve as examples of such hostile acts (Jaide, 2011; Pantucci and Jesperson, 2015; Markovic, 2019). It can be observed that Boko Haram's goals and strategies have changed throughout its existence. Initially, the organization focused on confronting the Nigerian government and advocated for an Islamic state within the country's borders. After pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014, it adopted more extreme and aggressive strategies, including the use of suicide bombers and attacks on civilians (Hentz, 2018). According to Oriola (2016), Boko Haram carried out 493 attacks in 2014, killing 7,112 people, including both victims and perpetrators (with victims accounting for 97 percent of the dead). On average, there were about 15 fatalities in each incident. Contrastingly, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) carried out 1,241 attacks in the same year, killing 9,324 people. Consequently, ISIS was responsible for an estimated seven fatalities per attack in 2014, which is significantly less than half the average fatalities caused by Boko Haram per attack.

The attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria have had a significant economic impact due to the group targeting its attacks on commercial enterprises, and essential public facilities, causing disruptions to economic operations and impeding progress. For instance, estimates indicate that Nigeria's macroeconomic condition has

been significantly affected by the loss of foreign direct investment (FDI) and potential FDI inflows amounting to 1.33 trillion naira, affecting mainly the northeast region. This damage manifests itself in the form of infrastructural decay, disruption of local and intra-African trade, and mortality and displacement, each of which has profound implications for labor markets, tourism, and transportation. These challenges are exacerbated by increased business costs triggered by rising risk and insurance premiums, as well as disruption of foreign and local investment due to perceived instability and the resulting paralysis of services, particularly air transport. In addition, heightened border security measures have led to disruptions in intraregional trade and business, particularly between Nigeria and Cameroon, resulting in delays to infrastructure projects such as the Chad-Cameroon railroad (Ikpe, 2017).

The attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria have also led to significant threats to the country's security. According to Hentz (2018), the group has been blamed for numerous deaths and physical harm, contributing to the prevailing atmosphere of apprehension in the nation. The impact of Boko Haram attacks on the social fabric of Nigeria has been significant (Nnorom (2021). According to Williams and Istifanus (2017) and the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (2018), the education sector in the region has been affected by the group's targeted attacks on schools and teachers. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that the extremist group Boko Haram is responsible for the deaths of some 2,295 educators and the displacement of more than 19,000 educators. This unrest is exacerbated by the destruction or looting of some 1,400 educational institutions, primarily in the northeastern region. The immediate result is that more than 600,000 children have no access to education (UNICEF, 2017). The group was also observed to target religious leaders and places of worship, fueling interfaith tensions (Olaniyan and Asuelime, 2014; Onapajo and Usman, 2015; Olojo, 2017). In addition, the group has reportedly abducted women and children, exacerbating the security situation in the region and leading to an increase in gender-based violence (Okoli and Azom 2019; Ajayi, 2020; Oluwaniyi 2021).

The attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria also have humanitarian consequences in addition to economic, security, and social impacts. The group's activities have also resulted in significant displacement, forcing large numbers of people to leave their homes and communities. The number of people in need of

humanitarian assistance such as food, shelter, and medical care has increased significantly (UNHCR, 2019; Onapajo, 2020). Campbell (2011) reported that between May 29, 2011, and February 2, 2021, 39,311 people died from terrorist attacks and Nigerian counterattacks. According to the Humanitarian Country Team (2018), the number of displaced Nigerians has exceeded 2.5 million, with millions seeking refuge in neighboring countries. In addition, over 7.1 million Nigerians face existential threats and need immediate humanitarian assistance. The human rights implications of Boko Haram's attacks in Nigeria are significant, particularly as the group reportedly commits extrajudicial killings and other forms of violence against civilians (Ojo, 2010).

The global impact of Boko Haram's attacks has also been felt. The group has been designated as a terrorist organization by several nations, including the United States, and its activities have contributed to overall instability in the region. The Institute of Economics and Peace (2015), Okolie-Osemene and Okolie-Osemene (2019), and Ojo (2020) have found that regional security and economic development have been negatively affected. The Nigerian health care system has also been severely affected by Boko Haram attacks on hospitals and medical personnel, leading to a decline in the quality of regional medical care. This is true even as the phenomenon has had a significant impact on the physical and psychological well-being of the population, particularly in regions where the group operates (Solanke, 2018; Ekhatomobayode and Asfaw, 2019; Oginni, Opoku, and Nketsia, 2022). The country's political landscape has also been affected by Boko Haram attacks. According to Ojo (2020), the group's actions have increased perceptions of insecurity and instability in the country, affecting the government's ability to govern effectively and provide services to the population. According to Brechenmacher (2019), the above incidents have negatively impacted public approval of the government and further exacerbated political unrest in the country. Overall, the group's actions have caused significant disruptions to economic activity, strained national security, damaged the country's social fabric, resulted in humanitarian consequences, and negatively impacted various aspects of society, including human rights, education, health, the political landscape, development, the environment, and social cohesion.

The group has been involved in regional conflicts in the Lake Chad region, which is contiguous with Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon. This has led to attacks in these

countries and affected regional security and stability. As a result, the negative consequences of the above circumstance have had an unfavorable impact on Nigeria's position in global peacekeeping (Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba, and Stiegler, 2014; Virginia, 2015; Hentz, 2018; Scott, 2020). The group has carried out several attacks in the area, including explosive violence. In 2015, Chad experienced a series of attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram, including a detonation in downtown N'Djamena. More than 23 people were killed in that incident. Chad subsequently deployed military personnel to the region to combat the dissident group (BBC, 2015; Scott, 2020). Nonetheless, Boko Haram's involvement in fighting in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon has resulted in significant destruction and displacement, as well as disruption of economic and social activities. The abovementioned has also contributed to destabilization and insecurity in the region, which, combined with the immediate consequences of hostilities, harms the inhabitants of these countries. These negative consequences have significant humanitarian implications, as they have contributed to the displacement of many people in the region. In addition, the attacks perpetrated by the group have caused physical damage and instability, leading many people to evacuate their homes and seek refuge in protected areas and camps. The ongoing conflict has also led to significant degradation of basic services such as health care and education and has contributed to the spread of disease and other health problems in the region (Badewa, 2022; Kangdim, et al., 2022). Mickler, Suleiman, and Maiangwa (2019) note that several countries have deployed their military resources and personnel to combat the group. In addition, these countries have formed regional alliances and partnerships to coordinate their actions. Despite these efforts, Boko Haram has continued to carry out attacks and has demonstrated its resilience as a persistent threat (Falode, 2016).

Despite the efforts of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) to combat Boko Haram activities within the country's borders, the group continues to pose a significant threat (Onuoha and George, 2016; Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020). Bappah (2016) attributes the inability of the Nigerian Armed Forces to effectively counter terrorist threats to the lingering effects of the country's long and intermittent military rule between 1966 and 1998, which prioritized regional quotas over qualifications in its military recruitment practices, reflecting ethno-political factions and fears of domination prevalent in the early years of the independent Nigerian military. This fundamentally shaped the professionalism of the military and continues to cast a shadow over the nature of

current civil-military interactions. Thus, despite the social and institutional changes in Nigeria since the transition to democracy in 1999, the country's foundational dynamics continue to influence sociopolitical structures and have manifested themselves in a deterioration of military professionalism post-1999 under civilian governments, inadequate counterterrorism management by senior military leaders, and a lack of resolve by President Jonathan's leadership and the military to fight the insurgency once and for all.

In particular, there was a significant shift in civil-military relations in Nigeria after the change from military to democratic government in 1999. Civilians exercised 'subjective control' over the military (Huntington, 1957), a development that led to the politicization of the military and consequently to an erosion of its professionalism. At the same time, concerns arose about the legitimacy of the recruitment process, which transformed military service from a national service into a platform for personal enrichment, while dwindling professionalism was exacerbated by non-transparent security spending and pervasive corruption (Bappah (2016). Second, the Nigerian military, bound by its constitutional obligation to quell internal revolts such as the Boko Haram insurgency, initially downplayed the threat—a mistake that became apparent under President Jonathan in 2014 (ThisDayLive, 2015). That miscalculation took a heavy toll, especially after the unlawful execution of the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009, which inadvertently strengthened radical factions within the group. As a result, the insurgents, who subsequently resorted to suicide bombings, guerrilla warfare, and the strategic use of social media for propaganda, intensified their threat to national security. In response, the government imposed a state of emergency in three northeastern states, signaling increased counterinsurgency efforts. However, these efforts were undermined by widespread discontent within the military, primarily due to inadequate equipment and declining morale, culminating in human rights abuses against civilians. This escalating discontent led to mutinies among soldiers and the proclamation of an Islamic caliphate by the insurgent leader. To make matters worse, the credibility of the military suffered from inaccurate public statements about its operations. On the contrary, Boko Haram demonstrated superior strategic communications and often appeared more reliable than the military, which exacerbated the erosion of the military's credibility at home and abroad. Third, although President Goodluck Jonathan established a military division and initiated counterterrorism

training, his strategies were perceived as inadequate and riddled with corruption. Furthermore, his perceived indecisiveness hampered both domestic and international assistance efforts. For example, alleged links between political elites, including then Borno State Governor Ali Modu Sheriff, and Boko Haram remained largely uninvestigated, and fueled skepticism. Criticism also stemmed from the Jonathan administration's underestimation of the insurgency's severity, which inadvertently contributed to its strengthening. The handling of the Chibok kidnapping also shone a spotlight on a missed opportunity to mobilize national and international support. This is even as Jonathan's preoccupation with his 2015 reelection campaign rather than fighting the insurgency was seen as a glaring misplacement of priorities (Bappah, 2016)

Given the obvious difficulty of combating Boko Haram militarily, the Nigerian government subsequently developed several strategies to address the underlying socioeconomic and political factors that have fueled Boko Haram recruitment and activities. These strategies, summarized in the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), were approved by President Goodluck Jonathan on April 30, 2014. The second edition of the strategy was released on August 23, 2016, during President Buhari's first term. It includes conventional military operations and efforts to improve governance, reduce poverty and inequality, and provide education and employment prospects for youth (Akinola, 2015; Eji, 2016). As a result, there are efforts to promote communication and harmonization among heterogeneous groups in the region. These include community-based initiatives that involve the cooperation of religious and customary leaders. Nonetheless, the government and security forces face challenges in addressing the root causes of the conflict and preventing the recruitment of followers by the group, which has demonstrated that it can exploit grievances in marginalized communities and among individuals to radicalize and recruit followers (Pérouse de Montclos, 2018). In addition, the government's approach includes negotiation tactics to free the abductees and cease hostilities (Nwankpa, 2017; Obamamoye, 2018; Jacob, 2019; Botha, 2021). Despite ongoing efforts, the conflict with Boko Haram continues, posing a major security challenge in the affected region. This phenomenon is largely due to the group's extraordinary ability to adapt its strategies and objectives in response to changing conditions. Consequently, the multi-faceted and complicated challenge posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria requires a comprehensive and coordinated

response from the Nigerian government. To this end, private military and security contractors have been proposed and implemented as a tactic to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria (Varin, 2018; Adamo, 2020; Kinsey and Krieg, 2021). Private security companies are organizations or individuals contracted by individuals or entities to provide security-related services. Kinsey (2006) and Percy (2009) have noted that the range of services provided can vary and include armed guards, security patrols, and specialized training and equipment. Governments and clients often contract these companies to provide various security services, including military and security training, logistical support, and security personnel (Avant, 2005; Percy, 2007). In this case, the Nigerian government contracted the services of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) to provide training, advice, and intelligence support to the military and other security forces to improve their ability to combat Boko Haram (Freeman, 2015; Kinsey and Krieg, 2021).

1.3 The Increasing Use of Private Security Services as a Means of Addressing Security Threats

The stillborn August 2000 defense agreement between the Nigerian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo and the Clinton administration of the United States on military aid is the first attempt to obtain foreign military aid since the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1999. After a long period of military rule, Nigeria transitioned to a democratic form of government, with President Olusegun Obasanjo serving as the country's first civilian president from 1999 to 2007 (Obiora, 2005; Esebonu, 2012; Ogunjewo, 2012). About a year after taking office, the Nigerian president entered into a cooperation agreement with the US military to protect the country's nascent democracy from the potential threat of a military coup. Although the president asserted that the agreement was merely a cooperative measure and not a formal treaty, critics claimed that the agreement should have been deliberated and ratified by the National Assembly and therefore labeled it a pact. Apart from the fact that the circumstances of the agreement are disputed, it was perceived by many people as a potential threat (Akpuru-Aja, 2003; Omoruyi, 2000). According to Kwaja (2014), the agreement offered the US the opportunity to train and retrain the Nigerian armed forces, protect the fledgling democratic system from military intervention, provide the Nigerian Navy with patrol vessels to monitor oil-producing regions, and protect

facilities in the Niger Delta, and train and retrain the military for peacekeeping missions. The project conducted by Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a private organization specializing in private sector leadership development, military-related contracting, and consulting services in the US and international defense markets, aimed to develop an action plan for integrating a reformed military system into a new civilian context. The study was conducted over 120 days by an eight-member team on behalf of the US Department of Defense and the Office of Transition Initiatives of the US Agency for International Development (Fayemi, 2003). The organization conducted workshops on civil-military relations throughout the country for civilians, high-ranking military personnel, and members of the armed forces. It also maintained an independent office and staff within the Nigerian Ministry of Defense (Kayode, 2003; Aning, et.al, 2008; Singer, 2008). The above assessment led to the approval of a new agreement called “The Transition-Civil-Military Program for Nigeria,” which focused on reorganizing the military and establishing and expanding new types of government organizations to address civil-military issues and the process of demilitarizing the entire society. Although the agreement provided important military support to Nigeria’s nascent democratic government, it was perceived by both Nigerian citizens and scholars as an undertaking that no serious-minded state, especially in Europe and North America, would delegate to foreign contractors. The reason was the potential risks to the country’s military autonomy, sovereignty, and territorial integrity posed by their access to the country’s security structures, networks, and data (Fayemi, 2003; Kwaja, 2014). While this was the first use of private security services in national security, it was undoubtedly not the last.

Similar to other African countries, including Somalia, Kenya, Chad, and Cameroon, which have faced numerous terrorist attacks in recent years, Nigeria has faced significant challenges since 2010 due to the persistent and formidable presence of the West African insurgent organization Boko Haram within its borders (Kulungu, 2021). Nielsen (2016) notes that despite initial official denials, the Nigerian government did not publicly acknowledge the involvement of private security services in assisting the conventional national security apparatus in combating the dissident group until a photo of a white soldier aboard an armored vehicle in Maiduguri, Borno State (northeastern Nigeria), surfaced on Twitter in early 2015. According to a report in the South African newspaper *Beeld*, Leon Lotz, a former member of the South West

African Police Force (SWAPO) counterinsurgency unit who had become private military personnel, lost his life fighting Boko Haram on March 9, 2015. According to various sources, a report was published by several media outlets indicating the presence of more than one hundred South African private military personnel in Nigeria (Allison, 2015; Gibson, 2015; Nielsen, 2016). News reports later confirmed that in December 2014, the Nigerian government contracted the private security firm Specialized Task, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP), which had allegedly enlisted the support of Pilgrims Africa Ltd, a private security firm in Lagos, Nigeria, to intensify counterterrorism operations in Nigeria and fight Boko Haram (Cropley & Lewis, 2015; Bosch, 2018; Varin, 2018; Murphy, 2020).

The rationale for private company participation in a previously government-controlled monopoly can be readily inferred. Incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan felt compelled to develop a resolution strategy when he realized that the escalating threat of the Boko Haram insurgency could hurt his chances of winning the 2015 election (Varin, 2018). The inadequacy of the Nigerian armed forces and efforts to address the socio-political factors fueling the insurgency required an alternative approach to the problem. Potential sources of support for Nigeria include its traditional geopolitical partners (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel) and private actors (Avant, 2001; Varin, 2016; Varin, 2018). Regrettably, the Nigerian government failed to obtain military support from its allies. This is because of the Nigerian armed forces' reputation for human rights abuses, corrupt practices, and fears of possible infiltration by Boko Haram (Varin, 2018). Consequently, the government resorted to seeking assistance from the private sector, whose employees were expeditiously branded as "mercenaries" by the media (Kinsey and Krieg, 2021).

This particular development is one too many. There has been an increase in the number of private security companies providing various services, such as the protection of public spaces and prominent individuals, security of oil installations, and maritime security. According to various sources, multinational companies operating in the Nigerian extractive industry, especially in high-risk regions such as the Niger Delta, are resorting to private military and security companies (PMSCs) to protect their personnel and assets due to the inadequacy of the Nigerian state (Avant, 2001; International Crisis Group, 2006; Lubeck et al. 2007). One such example is the Shell Petroleum Development Company. It is common knowledge that Nigeria's former

military leaders preferred to hire foreign mercenaries for their security needs rather than rely on local personnel. General Babangida, the former military leader of Nigeria who served from 1985 to 1993, is an illustrative example. According to Africa Confidential (2013), Babangida's key security personnel maintained close ties to Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In addition, individuals who described themselves as "Israeli security experts" were reportedly hired by this group.

The phenomenon described above should be seen as part of a broader, global trend toward privatization that began in the 1990s (Clarke, 2004). The phenomenon, which experts and professionals refer to as the 'privatization of security,' involves the transfer of tasks to private companies that were once the exclusive purview of government agencies such as the military or police. Private security companies, acting as legitimate businesses with financial responsibilities and providing protection and security services like other commercial enterprises, have begun to work with governments to offer their products and services on a global scale. This is mainly because they are believed to be better able to address various security issues due to their use of advanced crime detection and protection technologies and professionalism (Leander, 2005; Kinsey, 2006; Isima, 2007; Singer, 2008; Tonkin, 2011; Lind, 2012). In addition, state law enforcement agencies have security intelligence that enables them to identify potential security risks or vulnerabilities to a nation's resources, including data, networks, systems, and people. Milliman and Landon-Murray (2020) explain that data collection is facilitated by the organization's infrastructure, which draws from a variety of sources such as open-source intelligence and social media monitoring. By working with private security companies, the use of important information and intelligence can be used for protection and reinforcement purposes (Varin, 2018). This is particularly important because both traditional law enforcement and private security companies independently lack the resources necessary to adequately protect a country's infrastructure. Therefore, it is only logical that they work together.

The expansion of the global security services market can be attributed to increasing market demand as well as national and international legislation and policies. This market offers a wide range of services such as armed protection, guarding of strategic facilities, consulting, training, and state-sponsored counterinsurgency (Avant,

2005; Percy, 2007). Although often criticized by local communities and occasionally viewed with disdain (Cockburn, 2011; Varin, 2018), their involvement persists. According to the 2006 Securitas Annual Report, the private security industry has experienced an annual growth rate of approximately 7% since 1990 and has now accumulated a significant monetary value, as reported by Securitas AB, a publicly traded Swedish company known for providing security, surveillance, consulting, and investigative services in the private security sector. Similarly, Technavio, an established global market research and consulting firm with extensive experience working with Fortune 500 companies, has predicted that the private security sector market share will experience a significant increase of \$56.33 billion between 2021 and 2026, with a peak growth rate of 4.81% in compound annual growth rate (CAGR) (Technavio, 2022).

Almost every society has some form of privatized security, although much of the debate today focuses on the most obvious example: contracting companies to provide war or war-related goods and services. The concept of private companies providing armed security and military services gained scholarly attention through the involvement of Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International in the conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. These companies were contracted by the respective governments of the aforementioned countries amidst the civil wars that took place during the same period. The involvement of the private military companies sparked political and ethical debates about their responsibility and the likelihood of human rights violations. However, the termination of their involvement was a result of international pressure, which subsequently shifted the focus to the need for regulation and accountability of private military companies in conflict zones. It is important to note that the activities of these companies were used as case studies in early research on this topic (Tonkin, 2011; Mandrup, 2012).

Even though both organizations have ceased operations, the market for violence is expanding, especially in conflict zones. In recent decades, governments and corporations have increasingly relied on private security firms, as evidenced by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and, more recently, the Russian-Ukrainian war, formerly known as the Ukraine crisis, which began on February 20, 2014, but escalated to a full-blown war in February 2022, bringing Wagner PMC into the public and academic spotlight. (Kinsey, 2006; Nebolsina, 2012; Varin, 2014; Varin, 2018; Karagiannis,

2021; The Telegraph, 2023). It is hardly surprising that scholars and the media are so interested in the privatization of security in these countries. This is likely due to the significant presence of US military personnel in Iraq, which has been called the “largest ever” (Avant 2005; Kinsey, 2006). Consequently, the discourse on PSCs has shifted from its initial focus on the link between PSCs and mercenaries in the 1990s to a more comprehensive analysis and empirical discussion. This result can be attributed to the extensive amount of information in the social science literature, which includes various conceptualizations, theoretical discussions, empirical discoveries, and contributions to discussions on the privatization of security. Some studies show that private security companies have changed the nature of wars from what we previously knew to new wars. In other words, they found that it is an old game with a new approach (Duffield 1998; Singer 2003; Clark, 2004; Muenkler 2005). Lobo-Guerro (2007) has analyzed in depth the relationship between biopolitics and the privatization of security. According to scholars such as Mandel (2002), Singer (2003), Avant (2005), Alexandra, Baker, and Caparini (2008), and Berndtsson (2012), this trend has significant implications for civil-military relations and poses a challenge to conventional understandings of state authority over the use of force. Some research has also shaped the literature by examining the formation and role of “epistemic communities” and transnational networks of private security actors in this sector (Haas, 1992; Jones, 2006; Prenzler, 2013; Avant, 2016); the policy implications of these companies’ involvement in warfare (Leander, 2005; Kinsey, 2007; Crowe & John, 2017; Lekunze, 2019); and the role of security companies in a region’s post-conflict reconstruction and reform process (Abramamsen and Williams, 2006; Krahmann, 2007; Daase and Friesendorf, 2010). Some other researchers have gone even further and attempted to place the discussion in the context of the desirability of an enforceable international legal framework. The reason for this is primarily the confidential nature of their activities, which raises concerns about their accountability and responsibility, particularly concerning the violation of basic human rights in the areas in which they operate (Whyte, 2003; Kinsey, 2005; Leander, 2007; Buzatu & Buckland, 2010; Berndtsson and Stern, 2011; Perrin, 2012; Westmeyer, 2013). According to Zarate (1998), Kinsey (2005), Percy (2006), Kees (2011), Nebolsina (2012), Westmeyer (2013), and Kálmán (2014), there are challenges related to the

regulation of PSCs both at the national and international levels, so alternative governance models have been proposed.

One thing is clear: research on private security continues to grow. Despite varying findings, studies agree that the increasing reliance of states and international organizations on private companies for security and military purposes poses a significant challenge to the traditional concept of the state's exclusive control over the use of force (Avant 2005b; Leander 2006; Verkuil, 2006). Despite the numerous attempts that have already been made to create a theoretical and practical understanding of the aspects and problems associated with the privatization of security, as mentioned earlier, several issues remain unresolved and require further investigation.

1.4 Research Problem and Objectives

This study examines the effectiveness of the use of private security forces as a means of combating the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. This is because, despite concerted efforts by the Nigerian military and other security agencies, Boko Haram remains a major threat to Nigeria. Moreover, there is little empirical evidence of the effectiveness of private security services in addressing this security challenge, leading to concerns about their potential limitations and negative consequences. Based on the analysis and arguments presented in the previous sections, the main objective of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of the Nigerian government's use of private security companies in combating the activities of the West African insurgent group known as Boko Haram using an outcome-based methodology.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Evaluating the effectiveness of private security services in suppressing Boko Haram in Nigeria is important for several reasons:

1. This thesis seeks to conduct an empirical study of the use of private security services in Nigeria, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of such services in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. This study will help both military and nonmilitary organizations formulate effective strategies and tactics. The following assessment can also help regulate private security services in law enforcement,

intelligence, and other areas. This includes force deployment guidelines, training and qualification standards, and monitoring and liability protocols.

2. The study seeks to understand how private security services are fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria. This research may help governments and other potential clients considering such services.

3. The study will shed light on how private security services in Nigeria affect the rule of law, accountability, and human rights. The findings will lead to new and country-specific insights that underscore the need to establish effective and transparent regulatory mechanisms in this industry.

4. The study will improve knowledge of the security situation in Nigeria and how to improve it.

All in all, the study on the effectiveness of the engagement of private security services as a means of countering Boko Haram in Nigeria would be significant for policymakers, practitioners, and academics working in the areas of security, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism and would have the potential to inform the development of more effective strategies for addressing these types. By this examination, this thesis hopes to provide insight into the potential benefits and limitations of this approach and move beyond normative debates about PMSCs.

1.6 Thesis Outline

Chapter 2, the next chapter, provides a literature review to identify the conceptualizations and theoretical underpinnings of security privatization. This helps to place this study in the context of the existing literature so that theories and ideas shaping debates in the field can be identified and the foundation laid for the increasing use of private security companies. Chapter 3 provides a detailed overview of the research design and methodology of this study. It explains the rationale for selecting Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP), as the case study, including its significant role in providing security and counterinsurgency services in Nigeria. The methods used for data collection and analysis, such as document analysis, are also explained in detail. The chapter also describes the limitations and constraints of the study, including possible researcher bias and challenges in accessing sensitive information about STTEP operations. Finally, the chapter highlights the importance of transparency and ethical considerations when researching private military companies,

especially in contexts where these companies operate in sensitive and high-risk environments. Chapter 4 of the study discusses the findings of the case study on the private military company STTEP and its involvement in counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram in Nigeria. The chapter highlights the positive impacts of STTEP's involvement in these operations, such as improved security and reduced violence in the affected regions. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the viewpoints and experiences of key stakeholders, such as Nigerian government officials, military leaders, and local communities, regarding STTEP's operations. In Chapter 5, the study analyzes and interprets the findings in relation to the research question and objectives. It also examines the implications of the findings for the use of private security services in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria. It also identifies the limitations of the study and suggests areas for future research.

Finally, in Chapter 6, the Conclusion and Discussion section, the study summarizes the key findings and implications of the study and makes recommendations for the use of private security services as a means of combating Boko Haram in Nigeria based on the outcome-based approach adopted in this study

CHAPTER 2

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) or private security companies (PSCs) are organizations focused on security services to a variety of clients, including governments, corporations, and individuals. They provide specialized capabilities and expertise, such as military and security operations, that are not readily available in their clients' conventional armed forces or organizations (Kinsey, 2006, p. 2; Percy, 2009). The development of a literature review on private military companies (PMCs) broadly covers a wide range of topics related to their role, impact, and regulation, and includes their history, operations and legal status, the services they provide, and the clients they serve, the ethical and moral implications of their work, and the potential consequences of their involvement in conflict situations. This chapter, then, places this study in the context of existing literature so that the ideas influencing debates in the field can be identified and a basis for expanding the use of private security companies can be established. Max Weber's mid-16th Century concept of the modern nation-state as a community with the sole authority to use force is widely considered to be the most accurate representation of the contemporary understanding of the modern nation-state (Weber, 1964). Although this is a widely accepted ontology of the state, the concept of PMSCs has a long history in modern statehood and therefore raises the question of whether the state was ever really a sole entity with exclusive use of force. After all, the use of private forces dates back to ancient times, such as Hellenistic, medieval, early

modern, and contemporary history, when states and other political entities hired mercenaries for their wars.

2.2 The Evolution of Private Military and Security Companies

States, city-states, and empires formed and maintained military armies in the Hellenistic period. Thus, military service was often a civic duty or a way to earn a living, and soldiers were usually paid by the state or organization. In this period, mercenaries-soldiers who fought for money rather than out of a sense of duty or loyalty to a state or organization-were hired by states or organizations and were not organized as private companies. Griffith (1935) notes that Mycenaean mercenaries were important to the Greek military. In the third century BC, most Hellenistic soldiers were foreign mercenaries, with only a core of Macedonian-style Phalangites. Some 83 years after its initial publication, Griffith's essay remains one of the most accessible scholarly studies of the mercenaries who served in the armies of ancient Greece and its successor states. The Ptolemaic Empire, the Seleucid Empire, Pergamum, Pontus, and the Hellenistic colonies in Western Europe and Africa are examined, and the origins and sizes of the mercenary units of these empires are determined from numerous classical sources. Griffith (1935) concludes with the history of mercenaries, recruitment, payment, and maintenance. He explains that mercenaries from all over the world fought for the Greeks, bringing with them various weapons and tactics. Thus, he notes that hoplites, archers, and light cavalry from other Hellenistic and Hellenized nations (such as the legendary Spartan adventurers who fought during the Punic Wars and the light cavalrymen of Tarentum in Italy) fought alongside Illyrians, Africans, and other non-Greeks and that in the 4th, 3rd, and 2nd Centuries BC.

In addition, Verbruggen (1977) notes that different categories of mercenaries were used as contract fighters in the Middle Ages. Generally, rulers or wealthy private individuals hired these mercenaries to participate in military conflicts or to provide security services. However, the mercenary forces of the past lacked the organizational structure, specialization, and professionalism characteristic of today's private military and security companies (PMSCs), but the services rendered were usually remunerated. Accordingly, various mercenary forces emerged in the Middle Ages, such as the Varangian Guard in Byzantium, the White Company in 14th-century Italy, and the Free Companies in 14th- and 15th-century Europe.

Howard (1987) explains that mercenary forces consisted of soldiers motivated by financial compensation and were not necessarily associated with a particular ruler or government. This text gives several examples of mercenary groups throughout history. It notes that Free Companies, including the Great Company and the White Company, emerged in Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries (Nicolle, 1988). Accordingly, the Varangian Guard served the Byzantine Empire from the 10th to the 13th centuries, while the Byzantine Cataphracts were heavily armored cavalry units used by the Byzantine Empire from the 6th to the 12th centuries (Dawson, 1999). In addition, the Swiss Pikemen, a mercenary force, emerged in Switzerland in the 14th and 15th centuries (Nicolle, 1990).

According to Mockler (1969), mercenaries were often used by states and other political entities to supplement their armed forces or to provide specialized skills or expertise. He offers a selective treatise on various mercenary wars, from Xenophon's Ten Thousand to the exploits of the intrepid French Free Companies that brought about the end of feudalism, the daring Condottieri that ushered in the Renaissance, and the fighting Swiss soldiers whose exploits in foreign battles strengthened the nascent Swiss Confederation, as well as the role of mercenaries in the secession of Katanga in the Belgian Congo. Anthony Mockler (1969) explains that mercenaries played an important role in a variety of conflicts. This is despite his prediction that they would act as military advisors rather than actual combatants in the future, which has since been proven wrong. Thus, their involvement shows that actors other than the state have been involved in the use of force within the state system.

2.3 The Evolution of Warfare and Private Security's Changing Role

Today's private security firms operate as commercial enterprises and date back to the 1970s when they began subcontracting worldwide. Bamigboye (2022) argues that their increased visibility is due to their involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as their coordinated response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Subsequently, there has been a noticeable increase in the use of private military contractors, organizations that provide military and security services under contractual arrangements. More recently, governments have gradually transferred certain military and security functions to private companies. David Shearer, in a 1998 study published by the International Institute for Security Studies

(IISS), characterized commercial security services and military assistance as components of the private market for force. Subsequently, several scholars, including Robert Mandel (2002), Peter Singer (2003), Deborah Avant (2005), and Christopher Kinsey (2006), have published notable works on private military and security companies (PMSCs) that have become foundational literature in the discipline.

Christopher Kinsey, in his renowned publication, entitled ‘Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies’ (2006), highlighted several factors responsible for the substantial growth of private military companies (PMCs) in the post-Cold War era. First, the increasing privatization of various sectors of the economy, including the military, was accompanied by a shift in the nature of warfare that emphasized low-intensity conflict and peacekeeping as opposed to large-scale conventional warfare. This is because the end of the Cold War has led to a remarkable change in the global security landscape, characterized by the rise of non-state actors and the emergence of new types of security problems such as cyber threats, terrorism, and organized crime. This circumstance has led to an increased need for security services that are not traditionally provided by the military or law enforcement agencies. As a result, governments around the world have gradually delegated military and security functions to private military companies (PMCs) to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and avoid political consequences. Second, private military companies (PMCs) can be contracted to protect diplomats and government officials, train foreign forces, and conduct intelligence operations. Third, the use of private military companies (PMCs) guarantees access to competent personnel, as many PMSCs are staffed by former military personnel who have specialized expertise and experience that can be beneficial to both governments and companies. This is especially because contract personnel are often easier to access and less expensive to employ than active military personnel. The proliferation of new technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles, digital warfare, and remote sensing, has equally made it easier for private military contractors (PMCs) to take on a variety of tasks that were once the exclusive responsibility of the national military apparatus. In certain cases, governments have turned to private military and security companies (PMSCs) to circumvent the political and legal entanglements associated with using their armed forces. This is because the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) allows governments to act less conspicuously and avoid accusations of imperialistic or interventionist behavior. The author notes that Executive Outcomes,

established in South Africa in the 1990s, is one of the earliest examples of a Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) providing military training and support to African governments and other entities. Blackwater (currently known as Academi) is also a well-known PMSC that was established in the United States in 1997 and has provided security services in various conflict zones around the world. In addition, G4S, a UK-based company that provides a wide range of security and support services, is also a well-known PMSC (Blum & DeBruyne, 2020).

Singer (2007) categorizes security industry companies into two main categories: private security companies (PSCs) and private military and security companies (PMSCs). Private security companies provide security solutions to individuals or businesses that include services such as security guards, patrols, surveillance, and risk assessment. These companies are typically hired to provide security for venues or gatherings. Private military and security companies (PMSCs) provide military and security services to various entities such as governments, corporations, and organizations. These services include supporting military and police operations, training, logistics, and providing security in conflict zones. PMSCs are often contracted to provide security in conflict zones or to support military operations in countries where the government is unable to do so. The distinction between these two categories of firms can become blurred as certain firms that describe themselves as pure security firms enter into contracts that are commonly associated with private military and security firms (PMSCs). The task of distinguishing between the above categories can therefore be challenging, especially in cases where an organization serves both private companies and government entities. Therefore, it is imperative to accurately categorize these companies to gain a deeper understanding of their inherent characteristics and offerings.

According to Tonkin (2011) companies of this type offer different services tailored to the specific needs of governments, international organizations, and private clients, with a focus on military and security-related functions. They offer a variety of services, including military training and consulting, which can include training of military personnel as well as advice on military strategy and tactics. Experts are able to collect and analyze data on political, economic, and military progress on behalf of their clients. They also provide assessments of potential threats and analysis of threats. They also provide logistical assistance that includes transportation, equipment and supplies procurement, and logistics management. They also provide support for

humanitarian operations, including but not limited to disaster relief and refugee assistance. Categorizing private military and security companies (PMSCs) is therefore a complex task that presents numerous challenges, particularly because the transferability of military personnel with different capabilities to other entities fosters dynamic change within the sector, increasing the range of possible operations.

The motivations and interests of private military and security companies (PMSCs) and their clients vary widely depending on the circumstances and requirements of the parties involved. The alignment or conflict of motivations and interests between private military companies (PMSCs) and their clients can vary depending on the situation. Based on Kinsey's (2006) observations, one plausible incentive for PMCs could be monetary benefits. Private military companies (PMSCs) often charge fees for their services and may have the incentive to sign as many contracts as possible to optimize their financial gains. As noted earlier, private military and security companies (PMSCs) may attract clients for a variety of reasons, such as outsourcing military or security-related tasks, not having sufficient resources or personnel to perform these tasks in-house, or requiring specialized knowledge or skills. PMSCs may be motivated by a desire to contribute to global stability and security. Many private military companies view their activities as contributing to the protection of noncombatants, the promotion of democratic values, and the prevention of the intensification of hostilities. Additionally, private military and security company (PMSC) clients may have common goals and may be inclined to use the services of PMSCs to address specific security challenges or to provide support for peacekeeping operations.

According to Deep (2015), private security firms have become major players in global counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, suggesting a trend toward hybrid warfare. These formerly pariah companies now provide a variety of services, such as armed security, intelligence collection and analysis, and training of military and law enforcement personnel, to nation-states, global institutions, and individuals in both peacetime and conflict. Private security services were used in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These services were tasked with protecting military bases, convoys, and diplomatic missions. The use of private security contractors was observed in these contexts. The aforementioned contractors were also involved in training indigenous security personnel and obtaining intelligence on insurgent groups. In addition, they have been contracted to protect vital infrastructure,

such as oil and gas pipelines, in countries where there is a risk of insurgency or terrorism. In addition, government agencies and international organizations have enlisted the services of private security firms to protect diplomats and other high-level personnel in regions of heightened risk. Recently, the use of PMSCs has increased significantly, particularly in conflict and post-conflict scenarios.

Initial research on private military and security companies (PMSCs) focused primarily on exploratory aspects such as the emergence of the global market for military support and armed protection, the services offered by the industry, the distinction between private security companies, and the similarities and differences between PMSCs and traditional mercenary forces. However, subsequent academic work has enhanced the analytical complexity of the study of PMSCs by leveraging the extensive empirical data collected in the initial phase. The research includes an examination of the numerous obstacles associated with the use of PMSCs around the world, especially since their involvement in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan gained international attention (Kinsey, 2006; Nebolsina, 2012; Varin, 2014; Varin, 2018). One of the main obstacles to the effective regulation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) is their operation within legal ambiguity. According to Berndtsson (2011) and Perrin (2012), there is legal ambiguity regarding the activities of certain companies, although they are subject to some national and international laws. The possible outcome of this scenario is the emergence of ambiguity and disagreement about the degree of responsibility that PMSCs bear for their operations. Their use has led to fears because they can circumvent national laws and regulations, and are not controlled to the same degree as conventional armed forces. The potential for abuse of authority and human rights violations is also a concern with the use of these companies because they are less accountable compared to conventional forces. Moreover, the lack of transparency of these companies complicates the task of monitoring and enforcing their conduct. It is plausible that they conduct operations that are inconsistent with the legal and ethical principles of host countries, as they may be focused on financial gain rather than civic responsibility. Another challenge associated with PMSCs is their potential involvement in activities that may be considered contrary to international law, such as the commission of human rights abuses or the illegal smuggling of weapons. The scenario described above may lead to accusations of war crimes or other serious offenses, thereby diminishing the credibility of these companies as a potential security alternative. According to Rasahugan and

Khalil (2021), there has been extensive scholarly discussion on state regulation of the industry, which has been studied in various contexts, such as non-state market-based governance (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007), democratic security governance (Ejdus, 2010), nodal governance (Paasche, 2012), normative governance (Westermeyer, 2013), and narrow governance, which presents the changing role of the state in governance at three different levels: (i) state-led, (ii) state-supported, and (iii) state-managed (Daase & Friesendorf, 2010).

Varin (2018), Adamo (2020), Murphy (2020), and Kinsey and Krieg (2021) have found that private security services, including private military and security companies (PMSCs), have played an important role in counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram in Nigeria. The government has contracted these companies to provide training, advice, and logistical support to the military and other security forces, enhancing their ability to fight the terrorist group. The authors emphasize the benefits of using private security services, including their ability to mobilize and deploy security personnel and resources promptly, as well as their expertise and competence in counterterrorism. In doing so, the authors emphasize the importance of assessing the influence and effectiveness of private security services in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

2.4 Use of Outcome-Based Approach for Security Interventions Evaluation

To achieve the objective of this research, an outcome-based approach is applied using a case study of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) as a typical example of private security company involvement in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. The outcome-based approach is a technique for evaluating the effectiveness of a program, policy, or other initiative that focuses on the results or outputs achieved. This method is based on the concept that the primary goal of a program or policy is to achieve specific outcomes or results that are beneficial to the intended population or interested parties. Thus, the results-based management approach involves the establishment of clear and quantifiable goals for a particular program or policy, followed by an assessment of the extent to which those goals have been achieved. In this way, it is considered helpful to assess the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a program or policy and identify areas for improvement.

The outcome-based approach originated in the field of education. In the early 1950s, the objectives movement led to outcomes-based education. Tyler (1950) stressed the importance of beginning curriculum design with clear objectives. Once these were defined, content, technique, and assessment strategies would follow. Bloom (1956) and Krathwohl (1956) created taxonomies of educational objectives in the 1950s that helped establish this tradition. Brady (1996) explains that the approach has been used to theorize a way of learning that focuses on the student and to keep an eye on quality assessment and curriculum improvement. It focuses on what students know and can do and represents a paradigm shift in educational philosophy and practice that goes beyond simple adaptations to traditional structures and methods. In the second edition of his book entitled *Outcome-Based Evaluation*, Schalock (2007) states that the discipline of policy analysis as a whole continues to recognize the importance of outcome-based evaluation as a vital component as it meets the needs and interests of administrators, students, legislators, funders, consumers, and educators. This has proven to be true.

Tawhid et al. (2012) focused on the Canadian aviation industry during the implementation of improved aviation safety protocols. The study, while examining the prescriptive regulations argued for outcome-based ones where appropriate because the prescriptive regulations created technological and cultural barriers to measuring compliance. The study describes a novel method for modeling laws using Goal Oriented Requirement Language (GOL) and qualitative data because it helps create inspection questions, convert real-world data into target satisfaction scores, and analyze compliance, thus effectively assessing an organization's compliance. The study established that the outcome-based approach helps clarify who is complying with what and identifies ways to improve existing regulations. Similarly, Chircop and Machum (2016) conducted an outcome-based evaluation to assess the effectiveness of Canada's maritime safety and ship-source pollution regulations. They found that Canada's approach is consistent with international maritime law as governed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). However, the authors noted that Canada has not always adopted international conventions promptly, and their findings suggest that Canada's policy, institutional, and regulatory responses are a combination of proactive and reactive measures.

Several research studies have used outcome-based methods to evaluate the effectiveness of security interventions and reforms. In Schroeder, Chappuis & Kocak

(2013), the authors use the outcome-based approach to examine in detail the evolution of security sector reform (SSR) interventions and its impact on security governance over time in Liberia, Timor-Leste, and the Palestinian territories. Three key findings were identified. First, interventions shifted from simple security assistance to comprehensive models of security administration. Second, the methods used in these interventions evolved from coercive to less coercive and included more persuasion and socialization-based approaches. Finally, the influence of domestic actors on these processes increased over time. In addition, the study hypothesizes causal relationships that could explain these trends, suggesting more nuanced interactions between international interveners and the regions receiving the interventions. Despite these changes, the researchers note that power asymmetries persist and affect the effectiveness and equitability of these interventions.

This approach was also used in Bell, Murdie, Blocksome, & Brown (2013). This study uses a dataset composed of a cross-national time series analysis of post-conflict and post-disaster states, as well as military and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) humanitarian intervention data, to examine the impact of military and civilian interventions by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) on human security following humanitarian crises. The results suggest that while individual military or INGO interventions can improve less complicated human security scenarios, the combination of the two can act as a “force multiplier” for complex human security situations. Overall, the results suggest that both types of interventions can have a positive impact on human security, with the need for simultaneous engagement varying depending on the complexity of the human security objective. Another such study, published in 2016 in the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, used an outcome-based strategy to assess the effectiveness of security sector reforms (SSR) in the Jenin governorate in the Palestinian territories in terms of sustainable security for the population. According to the study, SSR programs and community security goals can diverge under unstable and fragile conditions. Externally imposed and top-down SSR processes therefore have several significant limitations. These include insufficient local engagement, neglect of governance issues, co-optation of political and security elites, and neglect of citizen perspectives and demands. The study found that the goals of a major donor-driven SSR program were not aligned with the security needs and expectations of Palestinian citizens as identified through the results-based approach. In addition, the assessment identified

several areas for improvement, including the need for additional resources and training once the current political and military instability subsides (Homel and Masson, 2016).

Similarly, Shigenoi & Maekawa (2022), studied the impact of foreign military interventions on rebel governance and human security, and found that the “thirst for legitimacy” influenced by military interventions has led rebel groups to engage in internal and external diplomatic activities. In addition, rebel groups driven out of an area by military intervention have sought to control their remaining areas by imposing fear, which can destroy human security in rebel-held areas. Finally, Bjarnesen (2023) uses an outcome-based approach to examine the effectiveness of international peacekeeping efforts and changes in the security sector in Liberia, particularly after the United Nations peacekeeping mission ended in 2018. The resulting findings underscore that Liberia’s stability does not depend solely on the success of official security institutions. Despite prolonged periods of capacity building and systematic change, both state and non-state actors in the security sector play a central role in maintaining day-to-day security. The study shows that Liberia’s relative peace paradoxically results from the enduring presence of these unofficial security actors rather than their absence. Consequently, the study underscores the need to consider both formal and informal security actors in future security assessments to gain a more holistic perspective of the security milieu.

As the existing literature indicates, private security services are used in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations around the world. The use of an outcome-based methodology facilitates a comprehensive and unbiased evaluation of a program or policy by determining the achievement of stated objectives. It also allows programs to be tailored to the needs of recipients, ultimately increasing their effectiveness. For these reasons, this study uses an outcome-based methodology to assess the effectiveness of private security services in Nigeria in combating Boko Haram compared to traditional security systems. Thus, the effectiveness of the security system in Nigeria depends on the ability of the various providers, such as the PMSC, the Nigerian Armed Forces, STTEP, local citizen militias, and the general population, to work together and find viable solutions to the persistent security challenge in Nigeria, especially in the northeastern regions of Nigeria where Boko Haram is primarily active. In other words, the effectiveness of this security constellation does not depend on the identity of the security provider, but rather on the cohesiveness of their approach to security and the consistency of their security protocols.

CHAPTER 3

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the outcome-based approach used to critically evaluate the use of private security companies in the fight against Boko Haram. Specifically, this thesis uses a qualitative analytical framework that is primarily a descriptive and exploratory study through the examination of scholarly sources, case study and data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The focus is on the effectiveness of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP), a Private Military and Security Company that operated in Nigeria between January and March 2015 in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Qualitative research is well-suited to this study because it allows for an in-depth examination of the experiences and perspectives of those involved in the deployment of private security services in the fight against Boko Haram. According to Trochim & Donnelly (2007), an in-depth inquiry is a critical component of qualitative research because it allows the researcher to explore the perspectives, attitudes, and experiences of participants in a way that is not possible with surveys or other quantitative research methods, primarily because it allows for open-ended questions and asks for more detailed responses, and unexpected insights that emerge during data collection can be followed up. It can be very valuable in a study such as this one because it allows for an exploration of the perceptions and experiences of key stakeholders regarding the use of private security services in combating Boko Haram through rich and detailed data that can help deepen our understanding of the phenomenon under study. It can

also shed light on the complex and dynamic social and political context in which private security services operate.

For a critical analysis, this thesis uses process tracing, a research method that shifts the analytical focus from causes and outcomes to the hypothesized causal mechanisms in between (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). In essence, the mechanisms are not causes, but causal processes that are triggered by causes and link them to outcomes in a productive relationship. In this way, this thesis examines the sequence of events or the course of decision making, transforming initial situations into case outcomes. Specifically, the research will outline the strategies and tactics used by STTEP in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria from January to March 2015. The goal is to show the causal relationship between the independent variable (STTEP deployment) and the resulting dependent variable (success or failure in combating Boko Haram) via intervening factors such as cooperation between the private security contractor and the state military, psychological warfare, guerrilla tactics, relentless pursuit, and improved technologies used in the operation. In essence, the dependent variable-the success or failure in fighting Boko Haram-can change, underscoring the need to understand how the independent variable can influence it through the intervening factors.

Based on counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, which recognizes four fundamental principles of counterinsurgency, namely that the primary objective of a counterinsurgency is to secure popular support, that the actor fighting the insurgency must define a precise political objective, that the actor must also fully understand the terrain, and that a significant commitment of labor, resources, and manpower is essential to a successful counterinsurgency (Galula, 1964), this thesis identifies three outcome markers, which include inclusiveness, sustainability, and effectiveness. In particular, inclusivity is understood as the ability of the collaborative security network to include state institutions and private security actors without undermining the legitimacy of the state as a provider of public security. Sustainability is assessed in terms of the longevity of security outcomes-from short- to long-term. That is, the ability of the counterinsurgency effort to bring violence to a level manageable by local security forces, the establishment of political, economic, and social institutions able to address the many of the structural problems fomenting instability, and ability to eliminate the hatreds, mistrust, and prejudices that fueled the conflict (Moore 2007; Shemella 2011). Finally, the effectiveness of the approach is assessed based on the recapture of territory, the frequency of Boko Haram attacks, the capture of Boko

Haram members, civilian casualties, changes in Boko Haram tactics, and whether STTEP operations were in compliance with international humanitarian law.

3.2 Research Design

This study uses case study research. The case, in particular, is Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection International (STTEP), a private military and security company that operated in Nigeria in 2015. This technique is ideal for an in-depth study of the STTEP case because it provides thorough information and insight into the background and conditions of private security firms in the fight against Boko Haram. This is particularly appropriate because the approach allows for a comprehensive examination of the topic under study using multiple sources of evidence, such as interviews, documents, and observations, ensuring that findings are based on a comprehensive understanding of the context and that conclusions are drawn from a variety of perspectives. It also lends itself to an inductive and exploratory approach, which is important when studying complex social phenomena such as the use of private security companies in the fight against Boko Haram (Frees and Klugman, 2001; Hyett, Kenny, and Dickson Swift, 2014). In this study, the outcome-based approach requires the use of both types of data to measure the effectiveness of the Nigerian government's use of private security companies in the fight against Boko Haram. In this way, data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) can quantify the impact and consequences of the use of private security firms, while a thematic analysis can reveal the experiences and perspectives of stakeholders (Yin, 2018). For example, Oriola (2016) used a similar approach to find that Boko Haram's use of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women is an extension of its "repertoire of violence" rooted in the sociopolitical and cultural environment of its main area of operation, while Iwuoha (2020) noted that Nigeria's official pronouncements on counterterrorism and the military, including government press releases, often contain "fake news" and "half-truths" that damage the military's public image and foreign support. Therefore, this thesis uses this approach to obtain solid, reliable, and contextualized results.

3.3 Case Study Selection

The involvement of the private military and security company Specialized, Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) in the war against Boko Haram in Nigeria led to its selection as the subject of a case study. STTEP is an acronym for Specialized, Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection. Although the details of its military contracts have not been made public, the company's website states that it has provided services in several regions, including "East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, the Far East, the Middle East, Central America, and Southern Africa" (STTEP International). The selection, therefore, provides a valuable opportunity to explore these issues in more depth and gain a more nuanced understanding of how private security services can be used to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria. This is because the case study methodology allows for a comprehensive examination of the specific context and circumstances surrounding the use of private security services in this situation. It also offers insights into the benefits, challenges, and outcomes of this approach.

3.4 Description of the Organization

Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and, Protection (STTEP) is a private security company based in South Africa that was contracted by the Federal Government of Nigeria to support the Nigerian Armed Forces in their efforts against Boko Haram (Cropley and Lewis, 2015). The company was founded in 2006 and was headed by Eeben Barlow, the chairman, until his resignation on September 20, 2020 (STTEP International, 2009). STTEP was contracted by the Nigerian government under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in December 2014 and was actively involved in efforts to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria. The company provided a range of security services to the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF), including intelligence, casualty evacuation, medical evacuation, supply operations, troop transport, and air support to the armed forces (Murphy, 2015; Varin, 2018), while fulfilling the terms of the contract through community engagement (Agbibo, 2015). The company's experience in this engagement will be a valuable source of information for this study.

3.5 Description of the Organization

STTEP has been selected for this study for several reasons. First, STTEP is a prominent private provider of military and security services in Africa, and its role in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria is significant. Analyzing the viewpoints and experiences of STTEP personnel and other key stakeholders involved in this operation can provide valuable insights into the use of private security services in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria. Second, the STTEP case provides a unique opportunity to examine the difficulties and consequences of using private security services in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. Although there is evidence of the involvement of another company, Pilgrims Africa, contracted by the Nigerian government to support efforts to combat Boko Haram, STTEP is the only company mentioned in the literature as being part of the Nigerian government's efforts. Third, the STTEP case is particularly relevant to the research question and objectives of this study, which is to examine private security engagement as a means of combating Boko Haram in Nigeria using an outcome-based approach. By focusing on the experiences and perspectives of those involved in this engagement, this study can provide valuable insights into the effectiveness and impact of private security services in this context. Another reason for selecting the STTEP case study is the potential of the findings to inform future research and practice in the field of private security and countering Boko Haram in Nigeria. By examining the specific context and circumstances of the STTEP case, this study can provide valuable lessons and insights to other researchers and practitioners working in this field. The STTEP case can also serve as a model or example for other private security companies or organizations seeking to participate in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria or similar contexts. By examining the successes and challenges of the STTEP case, other organizations may be able to learn from STTEP's experience and adapt their approaches accordingly. Finally, the STTEP case study may have implications for policy and decision-making regarding the use of private security services as a means to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria. By examining the results and effectiveness of this approach, this study can contribute to the ongoing debate and discourse on the role of private security services in counterterrorism in Nigeria and beyond. All in all, the selection of STTEP as the case study for this research is based on the relevance and significance of the case to the research question and objectives, as well as the opportunity to examine in depth the engagement of private security

services in countering Boko Haram in Nigeria for future research and practice in the field of private security and countering Boko Haram in Nigeria. It will also inform policy and decision-making on this issue.

3.6 Data Collection and Analysis Plan

Qualitative data sources were used to obtain the necessary information for this study. These sources used include academic journal articles, media reports, textbooks, and interviews with Eeben Barlow, founder, and CEO of STTEP Limited, conducted by Jack Murphy, a writer for SOFREP. SOFREP is a news platform covering special operations forces, military intelligence, and foreign policy, offering in-depth insights from veterans and experts to provide accurate information on various military topics. These interviews, conducted by Jack Murphy, provide direct insight into STTEP's presence and tactics in Nigeria. In addition, records from the Global Terrorism Database, are included in the study to provide statistical and numerical information on the frequency, patterns, and trends of terrorist attacks in Nigeria. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a data collection that provides comprehensive information on terrorist attacks at home and abroad, as well as the organizations and individuals responsible for these atrocities. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland records all incidents that have occurred from 1970 to the present and includes them in its database. It is common practice for researchers, policymakers, and counterterrorism practitioners to rely on GTD to gain a better understanding of the global nature, patterns, and trends of terrorism. Therefore, the justification for using GTD in this study is that it allows for a systematic and objective look at the issue and measures the effectiveness of STTEP's presence and operations in Nigeria, which is important for a results-oriented approach. In general, these sources provide detailed descriptions, observations, and viewpoints on the topic of study, all of which are necessary to gain an in-depth understanding of the issue at hand.

With respect to the data analysis plan, data collected through interviews conducted by Jack Murphy, the Global Terrorism Database, and documents are analyzed using thematic analysis. This involves identifying themes and patterns in the data and examining how these themes relate to the research questions. Data trustworthiness is ensured through the use of multiple data sources and reflexivity.

This means that the researcher is aware of his biases and assumptions and has thought about how they might affect the research process and findings.

3.7 Limitations and Restrictions

A case study provides an in-depth assessment of an example of private security services in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria because it offers insights for future studies and practices. Despite these benefits, this study, like all research methods, has its limitations and restrictions. This study focuses on a single case of the private security company, STTEP. Although a single but thorough case study can be helpful, the results may not be generalizable to other private security companies or situations. This is especially true since inductive generalizations from a single case are often discouraged. However, this thesis recognizes that “analytic induction” can be used to draw empirical generalizations from a single case. In this way, hypotheses are developed and then tested on additional cases (Goldenberg, 1993). Although this method can be controversial, it provides insightful information and can serve as a basis for further research. This thesis, thus, recognizes that generalizations based on a single case should be avoided, but this study is a useful starting point for further research.

Due to the confidential nature of the data held by private military and security companies, obtaining access to pertinent documents and information can be challenging. More so, qualitative data requires building trust and relationships with participants, but if key players refuse to engage, it can be difficult to get to them. In addition, thematic analysis is time-consuming and requires attention to detail. Thus, it can be challenging to identify and explore all relevant themes and patterns in the data, and it may be necessary to revise and refine the analysis as the study progresses. Another limitation is bias in case selection. The researcher’s views may have influenced the selection of STTEP for the case study, and the sample for counterinsurgency by private security firms may not be representative or unbiased. The researcher’s bias and prejudice may also affect the case study technique. The researcher is aware of this potential bias and has taken steps to limit its impact on the research findings through reflexivity and to ensure that the findings inform the case being studied. These steps were taken to ensure that the findings were embedded solely in the context and circumstances of the case.

CHAPTER 4

4. RESULTS

4.1 The Hiring of STTEP by the Nigerian Government to Counter Boko Haram

The Nigerian Armed Forces, surprisingly one of Africa's most respected armies, having participated in more than 25 operations since 1960 and also playing a key role in international peacekeeping operations, is now plagued by endemic corruption, inadequate strategic doctrine, poor training, and inadequate equipment, demonstrating its inability to conduct a counterinsurgency operation (COIN) in the north (Varin 2018). For example, the group attacked government and military facilities as well as civilians, and at times managed to take control of large areas of the country, such as northeastern Borno and parts of Adamawa and Yobe states, without the Nigerian armed forces being able to mount an effective counter-operation (Omeni, 2018). As the growing threat could cause then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan to lose the March 28, 2015, presidential election, especially as the abduction of more than 250 girls had sparked reactions around the world, the decision to hire military contractors became even more attractive, even as the Nigerian government justified the outsourcing of military expertise to contractors on the grounds that it was necessary for the training and deployment of sophisticated equipment. As the Nigerian military struggled to contain the group and was criticized for its lack of success in countering its attacks, contracting STTEP was seen as a way to address these issues and provide the Nigerian military with the "strategic, operational, and tactical" support it needed to effectively combat the group (Cropley and Lewis, 2015; Murphy, 2015), especially as it appeared that previous training by outsiders such as the US and France left much to be desired. Eeben Barlow, former chairman of STTEP, described all such missions

in Africa as failures due to “poor training, bad advice, [a] lack of strategy, vastly different tribal affiliations, ethnicity, religion, languages, cultures, and not understanding the conflict and [the] enemy,” particularly the nature of counterinsurgency (Murphy, 2020; Adamo, 2020, p.7).

Eeben Barlow, former chairman of STTEP, revealed that the company was originally contracted in mid-December 2014 to train a rescue force for the Chibok girls. However, due to the tactical growth of Boko Haram, the company was soon transformed into a combat force known as the 72nd Mobile Strike Force (72MSF). This transformation occurred when the insurgents began seizing territory, including Gwoza, and extending their control to parts of Baga near Lake Chad in early January 2015. As a result, they gained control of about 20,000 square miles, which is slightly larger than Costa Rica (Murphy, 2015; Nielsen, 2016). This strike force, which the company had carefully assembled “from scratch” to rescue the Chibok girls, had “its own organic air support, intelligence, communications, logistics, and other relevant combat support elements” and began training in January 2015, then conducted its first highly successful operation in late February 2015 (Blair, 2015; Murphy, 2015).

4.2 The Methods and Strategies Employed by STTEP

The STTEP approach as a security contractor enhanced the capabilities of local forces by providing training, strategic guidance, and air and artillery support to the 72nd Mobile Strike Force on the principle of relentless warfare. According to Eeben Barlow, “the Strike Force was never intended to hold the ground. Instead, it operated on the principle of relentless offensive” (Murphy, 2015b), which he describes as key to effective counterinsurgency, similar to the strategy employed by Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone (Adamo, 2020). This approach, a form of unconventional mobile warfare, involves continuously pursuing and attacking the enemy, particularly a non-state actor such as a terrorist group that does not have a defined battlefield or traditional command structure, without allowing it to regroup or recover. The primary objective of relentless pursuit is to disrupt the enemy’s operations and prevent it from consolidating its gains (Barlow, 2011). To achieve this, a combination of military and nonmilitary means are used to pressure the enemy, such as targeted airstrikes, ground operations, reconnaissance, and psychological operations. In this way, the enemy’s operations are disrupted by creating a constant

state of uncertainty that makes it difficult for them to plan and execute operations, keeps them on the defensive, and prevents them from gaining popular support. In the past, the Boko Haram group relied on guerrilla tactics, striking unexpectedly and choosing its own time and place in the hope that media coverage would increase the impact of its attacks. Under the leadership of Major General Barlow, who commanded the 72nd Mobile Strike Force, a new strategy was introduced. Instead of adopting a defensive posture, the team actively sought out and engaged the enemy, using aggressive tactics to weaken its defenses and ultimately overwhelm it with superior firepower. To implement this relentless pursuit, Barlow emphasized the importance of troops being able to feed on the move, quickly track the enemy, use helicopters to stay ahead of the enemy, communicate effectively, be aggressive, be proficient in night operations, and have greater firepower than enemy forces (Murphy, 2015b).

This approach typically involves horizontal and vertical operations by special or intelligence forces trained to operate independently yet in coordination with other units such as reconnaissance units and military units equipped with advanced technology such as drones and other surveillance equipment. In this way, the STTEP contractors were responsible for leading and organizing the effort; they were responsible for decision-making, communications, and strategy (Murphy, 2015b). They worked closely with Nigerian forces during the fighting and directed local troops to specific regions, unlike previous operations that relied on aerial surveillance information conducted by US and French forces in the area that was not shared with Nigerian forces until 24-48 hours after the fact. (Barlow, 2018). At the same time, the hired forces employed aerial vehicles, such as helicopters and armed aircraft, maneuvering swiftly and close to the ground to engage Boko Haram militants both during the day and at night, which ultimately led to the destruction of numerous Boko Haram assembly points, concentrations, and equipment. Barlow (2018) notes that this approach negatively impacted the numbers and morale of Boko Haram forces.

The use of psychological warfare, also known as “psywar” or “PSYOP,” is not a new concept and was not developed in Nigeria, but it is recognized as an effective counterinsurgency tool and has been identified as an important component in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. The aim is to sway the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of a target group or adversary, leading to a reduction in their will to fight while simultaneously gaining support from the [target] population (Crossman, 1952). In this

case, the Nigerian Army and the local population were the targets. This was largely because the Nigerian armed forces were struggling not only with a lack of capabilities but also with low morale. Therefore, STTEP, in collaboration with the Nigerian Armed Forces, used psychological warfare tactics to increase the troops' level of aggression and instill fear in the enemy. This approach was critical for the Nigerian Army, which had previously struggled with low morale because it was often overrun by insurgents and fled from operations, resulting in valuable equipment falling into the hands of Boko Haram (Murphy, 2015b; Adamo, 2020). Psywar, deployed on the principle of relentless pursuit and used to combat Boko Haram in the Mafa region in January 2015, proved successful. The terrorist group carried out a series of attacks on the local population, causing many to flee to Maiduguri. As a result, a military unit was dispatched to retake the town of Mafa, located about 57 kilometers west of Maiduguri. The mission was a success, recapturing the town and pushing Boko Haram back about five kilometers. The 7th Infantry Division took control of the town, and the 72 MSF soldiers returned to Maiduguri to the cheers of the local population. Despite ongoing efforts to retake key Boko Haram strongholds in Bama and Gwoza, MSF gunships continued to fly sorties, and a small helicopter unit conducted several mortar attacks on known Boko Haram positions. Tragically, during a nighttime operation to prepare for the attack on Bama, a Nigerian Army T-72 tank mistakenly fired on an MSF MRAP, resulting in two MSF combat casualties. As a result, the attack on Bama was temporarily postponed. Nevertheless, MSF managed to recapture Bama from Boko Haram 48 hours later. Subsequent troops from the 7th Infantry Division quickly took control of Bama and cleared it to repel possible counterattacks by Boko Haram (Barlow, 2018). Similarly, media and security officials in Abuja confirmed that STTEP contractors conducted nighttime attacks against Boko Haram in Sambisa Forest, a large camp where the abducted girls are believed to be held by the insurgents. Accordingly, the Nigerian military reportedly moved in the next day and claimed credit for the successful operations (Nossiter, 2015). This suggests the effectiveness of psychological tactics and relentless offensive, as well as a strong partnership between the Nigerian military and STTEP.

At the same time, the STTEP approach aimed to shape warfare to meet the needs of the local population. This was achieved by teaching and enforcing basic ethical principles and by implementing social responsibility programs aimed at providing

essential services to the local population, such as medical clinics, clean water, and job opportunities whose ultimate goal was not only to provide aid but also to encourage popular participation in the fight against Boko Haram (Barlow, 2018). In addition, the STTEP approach also worked closely with local citizen militias known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF, which was established by Borno State in June 2013 and now includes thousands of volunteers, is considered a valuable multiplier by the Nigerian security forces. However, tensions have arisen between the CJTF and the security forces due to police and military brutality against the vigilantes (Agbiboa, 2020). Recognizing this divide and the utility of the local military for intelligence, translation, support, and local acceptance, the STTEP approach overcame these tensions by encouraging cooperation between uniformed forces and citizen militias in their operations to combat Boko Haram.

Events after January 2015 suggest that the deployment of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) may have not only helped Nigerian forces fight Boko Haram, but also laid the groundwork for the rejuvenation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was once a formation of LCBC states, i.e., the four littoral states surrounding the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), to promote sustainability, resolve disputes, and support integration, peace, and security in the LCB. Now it has been restructured into a unit to fight Boko Haram to address the problem of insecurity in the region. Thus, the MNJTF has now been transformed into a military alliance, established in October 2014, comprising soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. This was in response to the increasingly cross-border nature of Boko Haram's insurgency and the realization that a coordinated regional approach was necessary to effectively combat the group (Agbiboa, 2017). This alliance has conducted several operations against Boko Haram since January 2015, resulting in the recapture of areas previously controlled by the group and the disruption of its operations. According to the Nigerian government, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) successfully regained control of 36 towns in three different states during the months of February and March 2015 (Popovski and Maiangwa, 2016; Hassan, 2021). Despite these successes, however, the MNJTF has faced obstacles such as a lack of coordination and cooperation among its member states, as well as funding and logistical problems that have hampered its ability to fully carry out its mandate (Agbiboa, 2017).

Table 4.1: Table of Findings

Findings	Descriptions
The STTEP approach	Improve the capabilities of local forces through training, strategic guidance, and air and artillery support to the 72nd Mobile Strike Force under the principle of relentless warfare.
Relentless Offensive strategy	Involves continuously pursuing and attacking the enemy without allowing it to regroup or recover. It involves using military and nonmilitary means to pressure the enemy, such as targeted air strikes, ground operations, surveillance, and psychological operations.
Horizontal and vertical operations	Through special or intelligence forces trained to operate independently but in coordination with other units, such as reconnaissance units and military units equipped with advanced technology. STTEP contractors were responsible for mission direction, organization, decision-making, communications, and strategy.
Use of helicopters and gunships	Attack Boko Haram both during the day and at night, ultimately destroying numerous Boko Haram staging areas, concentrations, and equipment.
Psychological warfare	Used to increase the aggression level of troops and instill fear in the enemy. The psywar, based on the principle of relentless pursuit and was used to combat Boko Haram in the Mafa region in January 2015, has proven successful.
The success of the mission	The mission succeeded, retaking the town and pushing Boko Haram back about five kilometers. MSF succeeded in retaking Bama from Boko Haram 48 hours later.
Tragic incident	During a nighttime operation to prepare for the attack on Bama, a Nigerian Army T-72 tank accidentally fired at an MSF MRAP, resulting in two MSF combat casualties.

4.3 Quantitative Findings from the Global Terrorism Database

Assessing the effectiveness of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) within a relatively short time frame of ninety days may prove to be challenging in terms of long-term results and is contingent upon the evaluation criteria. However, according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), providing specialized tasks, training, equipment, and protection has significantly limited Boko Haram’s capabilities to execute acts of terrorism. When analyzing the number of incidents from July 2014 to December 2014, a total of 207 attacks were recorded, while between January and March 2015, when STTEP was operational, a total of 139 incidents were recorded, indicating a decrease in operations conducted by the

insurgents. However, if we use the same database to calculate insurgent attacks, 301 attacks were recorded between March 31 and December 31, 2015. This shows that, as Barlow predicted, the insurgents had successfully regrouped and their operations had become much more violent after STTEP’s tactical withdrawal at the end of its three-month contract, which expired around March 28, 2015, and coincided with the presidential election, because President Jonathan had promised that the contract would not be renewed if he lost the election (GTD, 2015; Murphy, 2015c; Varin, 2018; Adamo, 2020). Further analysis of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram from January to December 2016 shows that 251 attacks were recorded during this period, a decrease from the remaining part of 2015 following the withdrawal of STTEP. One plausible explanation is that Nigerian forces were able to improve their strength and morale through the training they received under the Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) program, which in turn led to more successful counterinsurgency operations. As the 2015 statistics indicate, the partnership had a significant impact on the forces’ operational strategies and provided valuable lessons on the benefits of an integrated approach to the doctrine of “relentless pursuit.” However, the significant decline in success rates in the remaining part of 2015 raises concerns that the Nigerian armed forces may have reverted to their past practices.

Table 4.2: STTEP’s impact on Nigerian counterterrorism in data.

Period	Number of Attacks
July-Dec 2014	207
Jan-Mar 2015	139
Mar-Dec 2015	301
Jan-Dec 2016	251

Moreover, the decline in attacks over the life of the contract is also related to the number of civilian casualties and fatalities. If the frequency of attacks decreases, the likelihood that there will be fewer casualties also increases. To determine whether the decline in terrorist attacks and civilian casualties in Nigeria can be attributed to the presence of STTEP, this study examines the relationship between the decline in terrorist attacks and the decline in civilian casualties using data from the 2016 Global

Terrorism Index and finds that the dataset shows a 34 percent decline in terrorist attack deaths in Nigeria in 2015 compared to the previous year, largely due to a decline in Boko Haram activity (Global Terrorism Index 2015; 2016). Moreover, the impact of the fight against Boko Haram can be gauged in part by the number of terrorists arrested and killed, although the lack of credible official records casts doubt on the accuracy of these figures, especially given that Nigerian forces have faced accusations in the past of overstating insurgent casualties and understating civilian casualties, such as in the Baga massacre, in which the government claimed 150 casualties while 2,000 civilians were killed (Felix and Ola, 2015). The possibility of politically motivated reporting, especially considering that the company was contracted before the elections and contributed to the ruling party’s victory, further complicates the matter and therefore makes it difficult to rely on such figures without significant proof. Nonetheless, the lack of a credible open rebuttal and the fact that the counterterrorism force was able to kill more Boko Haram fighters than its soldiers lost is some evidence of counterinsurgency success. The accounts of Boko Haram casualties in January and February 2015 vary. Some sources claim the Nigerian government killed 42 insurgents and captured 5 others, while others report over 200 dead in Maiduguri (ENCA 2015; Guardian 2015). According to a report published on February 18, 2015, a joint military operation was conducted to regain control of 11 towns and villages from Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria. The report stated that 300 fighters from the extremist group were killed during the operation, reportedly by the Nigerian army (Felix and Ola, 2015). This research notes that the frequency of clashes that month likely resulted in more casualties than arrests and that despite the limitations, the fact that a primary objective of counterinsurgency operations is to destroy the insurgents suggests that success has been achieved in the fight against Boko Haram (Galula, 1964).

Table 4.3: Reported Boko Haram casualties in January and February 2015

Date	Reported Boko Haram casualties
January 2015	42 killed, 5 captured
February 18, 2015	300 killed
Remaining days in February 2015	Over 200 were killed in Maiduguri

Source: ENCA (2015), Guardian (2015), Felix and Ola (2015). Note: There is no consensus on the exact number of Boko Haram casualties, and figures may be subject to politically motivated reporting.

Nevertheless, in assessing STTEP's involvement in Nigeria, the author notes elsewhere that the decision was a good one, largely because it has increased confidence in the government's efforts and boosted the morale of the national armed forces, which are now better able to fight the insurgents in a joint effort without undermining state authority in the region (Bamigboye, 2022). However, it is difficult to make a definitive statement about the overall success of the STTEP approach in Nigeria because success can be measured in different ways. Although the STTEP approach, which included the use of special forces and psychological operations as well as the involvement of local militias, resulted in a significant reduction in violence during the period in which it was used, it could also be argued that it did not fully succeed in eradicating Boko Haram and that the group continues to pose a significant threat in the region, especially when considered in the context of an effective counterterrorism strategy, which Shemella (2011) describes as a comprehensive approach that employs various "instruments of national power" and encompasses all the resources and means necessary to address the complexity of terrorist threats. In this sense, Bamigboye (2022) describes an effective counterterrorism strategy as one that goes beyond military means to include intelligence, law enforcement, and cooperation with civil society, as each of these tools plays a unique role in counterterrorism. Thus, it could also be argued that this collaborative security web has not fully addressed the underlying problems that led to the rise of Boko Haram, such as poverty, unemployment, and marginalization, nor has it been able to fully gain the support of the local population, as tensions continue to exist between the local population and the security forces (Bamidele, 2016). Therefore, the success of STTEP's approach in Nigeria can be described as mixed, as it has had some success in reducing the level of violence and destabilization caused by Boko Haram during the period it operated in Nigeria, but has not been able to completely eradicate the group and has not fully addressed the underlying problems or gained popular support. The foregoing thus implies that in assessing the effectiveness of STTEP in the fight against Boko Haram, only the military aspect is considered and the social and political factors are neglected. As a result, while STTEP has been successful at the operational level, social and

political issues remain a problem in the fight against Boko Haram terrorists and insurgent elements. Therefore, it can be said that STTEP has impacted counterinsurgency primarily at the operational level, resulting in temporary strategic success. The study's findings show that the implementation of STTEP tactics through the use of Special Forces such as special operations forces and intelligence effectively hindered the group's operations and prevented it from gaining momentum. In addition, the integration of nonmilitary tactics, such as psychological operations and civil-military efforts, also played an important role in gaining popular support and isolating the group from its support networks consequently demonstrating the effectiveness of the STTEP approach in countering the threat posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria, albeit at the operational level.

It appears that the value of a public-private military partnership was recognized by President Muhammadu Buhari, a former military general, and successor to President Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari who had criticized his predecessor's use of a private military company before taking office (Olasupo 2018). According to the Anadolu News Agency, it has been alleged that Buhari himself employed equipment and private military companies from STTEP, even though he had previously spoken out against the use of South African mercenaries and stated that their presence would not be tolerated under his leadership (Olasupo 2018). Although the Nigerian government has officially denied these allegations, the possibility of rehiring these mercenaries is reportedly currently being discussed within the Ministry of Defense and the Nigerian military (Campbell 2015; Adamo, 2020).

All of these suggest that it is critical to understand that political leadership must look at STTEP's military successes to establish a longer-term counterinsurgency policy. According to Onapajo's (2017) analysis, the political leadership, especially after the transition from Jonathan to Buhari, who has a military background and is implementing a comprehensive strategy that includes diplomatic/multilateral tactics and internal military reorganization, has enabled a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency that has resulted in favorable military engagement with anti-government forces and strategic investments, although the progress made should not be misconstrued as a victory. This research, therefore, concludes that it is important to recognize that STTEP alone cannot be considered a comprehensive solution to the Boko Haram insurgency. As a result, it is argued that it is critical to assess STTEP's

success in the context of broader counterinsurgency efforts, as the insurgency in Nigeria is a complex problem that requires a comprehensive approach that includes not only military operations, but also political, economic, and social measures. It is also important to consider the short- and long-term success of STTEP, especially since it has achieved short-term successes, such as reducing violence in the areas of operation, but it is uncertain whether these successes will last in the long term, especially since according to Mayeni Jones of the *British Broadcasting Corporation* (2023), Boko Haram is still raging in the northeast and it is still too dangerous to travel by road between Yobe and Borno states unless a comprehensive approach is taken that addresses the underlying problems fueling the insurgenc.

CHAPTER 5

5. PRIVATE SECURITY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

5.1 Interpretation of the Results in Relation to Previous Research on Private Security and Counter-Insurgency Efforts

This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the key findings that align with established research on the use of private security in counterinsurgency. The case study presents empirical evidence that corroborates the proposition that private security firms possess the capacity to contribute to efficacious counterinsurgency tactics. Private security firms have the essential resources and specialized knowledge to assist in counterinsurgency operations, particularly in situations where government security forces are deficient in their ability to carry out such operations efficiently. The involvement of private entities in warfare has the potential to enhance counterinsurgency efforts by fostering confidence and providing assistance to local security forces and communities through initiatives such as training, capacity development, and community engagement. The promotion of openness, accountability, and trust-building necessitates the active involvement of local institutions and groups. The research additionally reveals that efficacious counterinsurgency efforts necessitate collaboration and efficient communication among private security companies, state security, and other pertinent stakeholders. However, it is crucial to investigate the enduring effects of private security on conflict, as this can explain the variation in the occurrence of attacks between the STTEP intervention and the post-withdrawal phase in Nigeria in March 2015, thereby

emphasizing the importance of using private security companies over an extended period for stability.

5.2 Private Security Implications in Countering Boko Haram in Nigeria

The research outcomes hold significant implications for Nigeria's battle against Boko Haram. The data indicates that private security firms, particularly those with prior experience in counterinsurgency operations in Africa, can provide valuable support to the Nigerian government and military in their endeavors to counter Boko Haram. The research indicates that private security enterprises, such as STTEP, possess the requisite expertise and unique experience in Africa to effectively tackle Nigeria's security challenges. Additionally, the establishment of collaborative and trust-building measures between private security firms and local communities has the potential to generate considerable advantages and is therefore considered crucial for private security companies. The examination of the impact of psychological warfare on the Nigerian military and local communities can lead to the achievement of this objective. The research also emphasizes the crucial significance of host community backing in the efforts to counter terrorism and insurgency operations, specifically in the fight against Boko Haram. This is because it diminishes the support for terrorists within the local populace while simultaneously promoting community support. As shown in this research, STTEP's strategy relies on the principles of open communication, collaboration, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) to cultivate trust and cooperation between private security companies and host communities. For this reason, the facilitation of communication channels between private security firms and community leaders has the potential to enhance the participation of local communities in security planning and execution.

The research highlights the significance of taking into account the long-term sustainability of private security firms in combatting Boko Haram. The case study has illustrated the prospective efficacy of private security companies in tackling pressing security issues. However, it is crucial to take into account the enduring consequences of their operations. This is because enhancing the capabilities of domestic security forces and other pertinent security stakeholders is imperative for attaining enduring stability. Therefore, using a systematic approach geared towards enhancing the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Nigerian Armed Forces is a more efficacious

strategy in attaining stability compared to a singular contractual agreement, such as the brief three-month contract entered into by STTEP and the Nigerian government.

The findings of this research indicate that it is vital for PMSCs to possess an understanding of and exhibit sensitivity toward the cultural customs prevalent in the regions where they operate. STTEP's contractors possess extensive experience working in Africa since the 1980s, thereby enabling them to have a profound understanding of the cultural and social complexities associated with conducting operations in the region. This played a significant role in the success recorded, particularly in the Northeastern region, where individuals' lack of exposure to education has limited their knowledge of diverse cultures. The aforementioned highlights the significance of private security firms comprehending and adhering to the cultural and societal conventions within a conflict zone to establish mutually advantageous relationships with the indigenous population. A potential approach to attaining this objective is to provide cultural education to private security personnel. Nonetheless, the industry must enhance the safety of its workforce against cultural misinterpretations by training them on indigenous customs, traditions, and societal conventions.

The three-month deployment of STTEP in Nigeria is noteworthy due to the absence of any documented instances of human rights violations, illegal activities, or subversion of state authority by the organization. This is noteworthy because these are significant issues commonly associated with the use of private security companies. Notwithstanding, it is of utmost significance that the Nigerian government and other concerned entities establish clear regulations and directives on the use of private security firms and devise mechanisms to oversee and enforce their responsibility beyond the requisites of international humanitarian law.

The strategic partnership between private security firms and other entities has been proven to be determinant in the combat against the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. To enhance the efficacy of security responses, it is recommended that formal cooperation and agreements be established among private security firms, the Nigerian government and military, international organizations, and other private security firms that are operational within the country. The respect of human rights by private security corporations in their operational areas is of paramount importance to establish a positive relationship with the local populace, foster their cooperation, and steer clear

of any unfavorable connotations that may be associated with their operations. Therefore, the implementation of efficient policies and comprehensive staff training is necessary to guarantee adherence.

5.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research

Although this study is very detailed, it has some limitations that must be pointed out. One limitation is the exclusive focus on STTEP, a private security company that operated in Nigeria. While this provides a comprehensive view of their activities, it may not represent other regional private security companies. Therefore, future studies should consider exploring other companies and states in the African region to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the significance of private security in combating Boko Haram. Another limitation is the use of a limited range of secondary qualitative data collections, such as Jack Murphy's interviews with Eeben Barlow, as well as document and record analysis. While these sources offer some perspectives, they may not fully capture the multifaceted experiences of private security enterprises operating in Nigeria. Additionally, the secondary researcher may have different contextual knowledge than the primary researcher, which could influence the interpretation of the findings. Thus, future studies should consider employing larger sample sizes and a wider range of data sources to enhance comprehension of the functioning of private security enterprises in Nigeria. The study examines the contribution of private security firms in Nigeria's efforts to combat Boko Haram, which is a timely and important topic. However, it may not have accounted for other variables that could impact the operations of private security enterprises in this context, such as the political climate. For instance, there is evidence that STTEP hoped for a contract extension after President Muhammadu Buhari took office, but it did not materialize. This highlights the correlation between the political and economic climate in Nigeria and the operational efficacy of private security firms. Therefore, future studies should comprehensively investigate a wider spectrum of attributes and circumstances to fully comprehend the function of private security services in Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram. It is important to note that the study's findings may lack generalizability to other nations or areas that encounter comparable security challenges because it did not consider the political and economic circumstances in Nigeria during the years 2014 and 2015. To gain a more comprehensive understanding

of private security firms' involvement in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria, future research should examine the socioeconomic milieu, experiences, and challenges of private security organizations over time.

CHAPTER 6

6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

6.1 Summary of the Main Findings

This study was conducted to assess the performance of private security agencies in Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram. The case study examines the operations of STTEP, a PMSC, during its deployment in Nigeria from December 2014 to March 2015. The methodology used is an outcome-based approach. This study has generated important findings and conclusions about the use of private security firms in Nigeria. This includes findings from the examination of secondary qualitative data obtained from in-depth interviews with Eeben Barlow, the founder, and CEO of STTEP Limited, conducted by Jack Murphy, a writer at SOFREP, as well as existing literature and data sets.

The key finding of the study is the critical role that private security companies such as STTEP play in the Nigerian security sector, especially when considering the ongoing challenges posed by extremist organizations such as Boko Haram. Through the use of expertise, training, equipment, and security services, the organization successfully contained the Boko Haram threat in northeastern Nigeria, ensuring regional security and stability. However, the success of private security firms should not be viewed in isolation from other factors. To effectively counter the multifaceted nature of the terrorist threat, successful counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism strategy requires measures other than the use of armed personnel. Countering Boko Haram's insurgency therefore requires a multi-faceted approach that addresses not only the war itself, but also its underlying causes, such as poverty, unemployment, and

marginalization. The findings of this study show that despite its military effectiveness, the STTEP has not been successful in addressing underlying problems and gaining the support of local populations.

Another important finding is that private security companies are capable of solving security problems, but their activities must be transparent, accountable, and ethical. Even if no allegations of unethical or unaccountable behavior on the part of STTEP were made, this remains an important undertaking that must be done. Thus, even if STTEP is not accused of wrongdoing, establishing a clearly defined legal and regulatory framework is critical to outline the duties of private security organizations and ensure their compliance with national and international standards. A clearly defined framework ensures that private security companies know their legal obligations and what penalties they face for non-compliance. Inadequate oversight powers can lead to potential consequences such as abuse of authority or misconduct, which can be avoided through appropriate safeguards. Therefore, a legal and regulatory framework must be established to oversee and enforce critical public safety requirements. Without such oversight, it would be nearly impossible to identify and mitigate potential threats or problems posed by private security firms. In addition, private security firms are more likely to gain the trust of citizens if they have a clearly defined process that is easy to follow. This is critical to ensuring a safe and stable environment and verifying the reliability and dependability of private security services.

The study's conclusions underscore the importance of improving coordination between private security companies and other security agencies such as law enforcement and government agencies. Although private security companies have specific expertise and knowledge, their ability to perform their duties effectively depends on support from these agencies. Facilitating collaboration between private security companies and other security agencies can therefore help align their objectives and ensure consistency in their operations concerning security and broader development goal.

6.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

1. Private security firms such as STTEP have the potential to solve security problems in Nigeria, including the threat of Boko Haram. The deployment of personnel with specialized skills, training, equipment, and protective services can increase overall stability and security in northeastern Nigeria, the epicenter of Boko Haram activity, as well as in other areas where the group may have a presence. This assertion is particularly valid given their ability to adapt quickly to dynamic circumstances and their broader range of specialized capabilities. In addition, public-private partnerships are characterized by relatively lower vulnerability to political interests and higher levels of accountability because they adhere to market forces and legal requirements and thus work effectively with government forces.

2. To promote the responsible and effective use of private security services in this context, it is critical to recognize the need for increased regulation and oversight. This can be achieved by establishing a clear and enforceable legal and regulatory framework that defines the functions and duties of private security organizations. Such a framework should also ensure that these companies operate following national and global standards. Moreover, effective regulation and oversight are inextricably linked to transparency and accountability. Consequently, private security companies must be transparent and accountable in their operations to provide responsible and accountable services. One method to achieve this is to create a clearly defined reporting structure, especially given the high rate of unreported human rights violations.

3. Private security companies and other security stakeholders, such as state agencies and local law enforcement, should work together to achieve a common goal and consistently incorporate private military and security companies into security and development objectives. Assessing the lasting impact of private security engagement is equally important. It includes concerns about sustainability, potential negative impacts on other sectors of society, and the likelihood of unintended consequences. To use private security responsibly and effectively, the state's conventional forces and regional law enforcement agencies must be strengthened and trained. In an ever-changing security environment, the military needs effective procedures even as other

measures such as community policing and intelligence-led policing (often abbreviated as ILP) can be introduced to solve complicated security issues. Further research comparing the effectiveness of the different methods and examining their potential drawbacks and unintended consequences should help explain how private security services function in this scenario.

REFERENCES

- Abrahamsen, R & Williams, M. (2006). "Security Sector Reform: Bringing the Private In.Conflict," *Security & Development*. 6. 1-23.10.1080/14678800600590595.
- Adamo, A. (2020). "The terrorist and the mercenary: Private warriors against Nigeria's Boko Haram," *African Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/00020184.2020.1788920
- Africa Confidential (2013) "On a Wing and a Prayer." *Africa Confidential*, 31 October. Available at <https://www.africa-confidential.com/> (accessed November 17, 2022)
- Agbiboa D.E & Maiangwa B. (2014) "Nigeria united in grief; divided in response: Religious terrorism, Boko Haram, and the dynamics of state response." *Afr J Conflict Resol* 14 (2014):63-97.
- Agbiboa D.E & Maiangwa B. (2014) "Nigeria united in grief; divided in response: Religious terrorism, Boko Haram, and the dynamics of state response." *Afr J Conflict Resol* 14 (2014):63-97.
- Agbiboa, D. (2015). "Resistance to Boko Haram: Civilian Joint Task Forces in North-Eastern Nigeria." *Conflict Studies Quarterly*. 3-22.
- Ajayi, T. F. (2020). "Women, Internal Displacement and the Boko Haram Conflict: Broadening the Debate," *African Security*, 13:2, 171-194, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2020.1731110
- Akinola, O. (2015). "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Between Islamic Fundamentalism," *Politics, and Poverty*, *African Security*, 8:1, 1-29, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2015.998539
- Akpuru-Aja, A. (2003) "The state and the military: Perspectives on Nigeria-USA military cooperation," *Strategic Analysis*, 27:2, 250-262, DOI: 10.1080/09700160308450086
- Alexandra, A; Baker, D & Caparini, M(eds.), 2008: *Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, policies and civil-military relations*. Cass Military Studies, Routledge: London and New York.
- Allison, S. (2015) "South African Mercenary Killed In Friendly Fire in Borno State-Daily Maverick," *Sahara Reporters*, March 11, 2015, Available at

<https://saharareporters.com/2015/03/11/south-african-mercenary-killed-friendly-fire-borno-state-daily-maverick> (accessed November 17, 2022)

- Amaechi, K. E. (2016). Islam as a resource for violence in the Nigerian Boko Haram. *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society (NJRS)*, 29(2), 134-150.
doi:10.18261/ISSN.1890-7008-2016-02-04
- Aning, K. et.al (2008) “The Role of the Private Military Companies in US-Africa Policy,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.35, No.118 pg.613-628.
- Anyaduba, C. A., & Maiangwa, B. (2020). Against memory-as remedy to the traumatic aftermaths of Nigeria-Biafra war past: whither justice? *Social Dynamics*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02533952.2020.1818442>
- Avant, D. (2005). “The Market for Force.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Avant, D. D (2005a). “Private security companies.” *New Political Economy*, 10(1), 121–131. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460500031297>
- Avant, D. D (2005b). “The Market for Force,” Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Avant, D. D. (2001) “The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatization of Security,” New York: Cambridge University Press
- Avant, D. D. (2016). “Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military and Security Services.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(2), 330–342. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43869076>
- Badewa, A. S. (2022). “Regional security complex: The Boko Haram menace and socio-economic development crises in the Sahel,” *Conflict, Security & Development*, 22:4, 321-343, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2022.2120256
- Bamidele, O.P. (2016). “Civilian Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) – A Community Security Option: A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach of Reducing Terrorism.” *Journal for Deradicalization*, 124-144.
- Bamigboye, O. M. (2022). “Does Outsourcing Security to Private Security Companies Impact International Security and Counterterrorism?” *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research (AJoTIR)*, Volume 3, Number 2, December 2022, Pp 5-31. ISSN 2732-4990 (Print) ISSN 2732- 5008 (Online) DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31920/2732-5008/2022/v3n2a1>
- Bappah, H. Y. (2016). “Nigeria's military failure against the Boko Haram insurgency,” *African Security Review*, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1151799
- Barlow, E. (2011) *Relentless Pursuit: A Neglected Coin Principle?* Eeben Barlow’s Military and Security Blog, <http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/relentless-pursuit-neglected-coin.html> (Accessed January 15, 2023)
- Barlow, E. (2019) “The Influence of Private Military Security Companies on

International Security and Foreign Policy,” Symposium of Leadership in a Complex World, November 14-15, 2018 University of North Georgia, The Military College of Georgia. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JLMifL8xeo&t=1815s> (accessed January 15, 2023)

- BBC (2015). “Chad suicide attacks kill many in N'Djamena,” Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33133511> (accessed November 17, 2022)
- Mayeni, J (2023) Nigeria election 2023: Has Buhari tackled Boko Haram threat? BBC, February 18, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64667959> (accessed February 18, 2023)
- Bjarnesen, M. (2023). Hybrid security governance in Liberia in the aftermath of UN intervention. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 23(1), 1-22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2023.2178100>
- Bell, S. R., Murdie, A., Blocksome, P., & Brown, K. (2013). “Force Multipliers”: Conditional Effectiveness of Military and INGO Human Security Interventions. *Journal of Human Rights*, 12(4), 397–422. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2013.812464>
- Berndtsson, J (2009). “The Privatisation of Security and State Control of Force Changes, Challenges, and the Case of Iraq,” Doctoral Dissertation in Peace and Development Research School of Global Studies. University of Gothenburg. Available at <https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/19412> (accessed November 23, 2022)
- Berndtsson, J (2012) “Upsetting the Civil-Military Balance? Exploring the Relationship between the State, the Military, and Private Security Companies” Chapter in T. Mandrup (Ed.), *Privatisation of Security: The Concept, its History and its Contemporary Application* (s. 15-38). Royal Danish Defence College.
- Berndtsson, J., & Stern, M. (2011). “Private security and the public–private divide: Contested lines of distinction and modes of governance in the Stockholm-Arlanda security assemblage.” *International Political Sociology*, 5(4), 408–425. doi:10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00142.x
- Bloom, B. S. (1956). “Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals: Handbook 1,” *Cognitive Domain*. New York: David McKay.
- Blum, D. A. & DeBruyne, N. F (2020). "Private Military and Security Companies: Background and Issues for Congress." Congressional Research Service, July 25, 2018. (Updated on July 29, 2020) Available on <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf> (accessed December 28, 2020)
- Bosch, S. J. (2018). South Africans offering foreign military assistance abroad: How

real is the risk of domestic prosecution? PER / PELJ, 21.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2018/v21i0a1721>

- Botha, S. (2021). "The women and girls associated with Boko Haram: How has the Nigerian government responded?" *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 28:2, 263-284, DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2021.1927167
- Brady, L. (1996). "Outcome-based education: a critique," *The Curriculum Journal*, 7:1, 5-16, DOI: 10.1080/0958517960070102
- Brechenmacher, S. (2019). "Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram," Working Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Massachusetts Avenue
- Buzatu, A. & Buckland, B. S (2010) "Private military & security companies: Future challenges in security governance," in DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper, No. 3.
- Campbell John. 2011. "Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink." New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc.
- Chircop, A. & Machum, E. (2009). "Shifting Focus: Towards Outcome-Based Policy and Regulation Making for Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution in Canada," In Timo Koivurova et al., eds, *Understanding and Strengthening European Union-Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean Governance* (Rovaniemi: University of Lapland, Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law
- Clarke, J (2004). "Dissolving the Public Realm? The Logics and Limits of Neo-Liberalism", *Journal for Social Policy*, 33(1): 27–48.
- Cockburn, P. (2011). "Rebels Wreak Revenge on Dictator's Men". *The Independent*, 28 August. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/rebels-wreak-revenge-on-dictators-men-2345261.html> (accessed November 20, 2022)
- Cropley, E. & Lewis, D. (2015) "Nigeria Drafts in Foreign Mercenaries to Take on Boko Haram." *Reuters*, March 12, 2015. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-violence-mercenariesidINKBN0M80X920150312> (accessed November 17, 2022)
- Crowe, J & John, A (2017) "The Status of Private Military Security Companies in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Under the International Law of Armed Conflict" 18 *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 16, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090583>
- Daase, C., & Friesendorf, C. (Eds.). (2010) "Rethinking security governance: The problem of unintended consequences." Routledge.
- Dawson, T. (1999) *The Byzantine Cataphract: Its Origins and Evolution*," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, vol. 92, no. 2, pp. 391-408.)
- Deep, A. (2015). "Hybrid Warfare: Old Concept, New Techniques", *Small Wars Journal*, 2 March 2015, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old->

concept-new-techniques (accessed 3 January 2022).
doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2012.737170

- Doswald-Beck, L. (2007) "Private military companies under international humanitarian law," in Chesterman, Simon and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), 2007: *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 115-138.
- Duffield, M (1998) "Post-Modern Conflict, Warlords, Post-adjustment States, and Private Protection." *Civil Wars*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 65-102.
- Ejdus, F. (2010). "Democratic security sector governance in Serbia" (Vol. 94, p. 36). *DEU. Assam. The SIJ Transactions on Industrial, Financial & Business Management*, 2(7), 305-316. Retrieved August 16, 2017.
- Eji, E. (2016). "Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs*, 18:3, 198-220
- ENCA (2015) "Nigerian army kills 42 Boko Haram fighters." ENCA. 16 January, 2015 <https://www.enca.com/africa/nigerian-army-kills-42-boko-haram-fighters> (Accessed February 16, 2023)
- Ekhaton-Mobayode, U.E. & Asfaw, A. A (2019). "The child health effects of terrorism: evidence from the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria," *Applied Economics*, 51:6, 624-638, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2018.1502871
- Esebonu, E.N. (2012). "The Mass Media and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa: The Nigerian Perspective," *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 21(4), 183-198
- Falode J. A. (2016). "The nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram War, 2010–2015: A strategic analysis." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 10, no.1
- Fayemi, J. K. (2003) "Governing the Security Sector in a Democratising Polity: Nigeria," in Cawthra, G & Luckham, R (ed) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, London: Zed Books.
- Felix, B and Ola, L. (2015). Nigeria military says kills 300 Boko Haram militants in counter offensive." *Reuters*. 18 February. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence-idUSKBN0LM0WN20150218> (Accessed February 12, 2023)
- Freeman, C. (2015) 'South African mercenaries' secret war on Boko Haram', *The Telegraph*, May 10, 2015;
- Frees, E. W & Klugman, S. (2001). "Case Studies Add Unique Perspective," *North American Actuarial Journal*, 5:4, iii-iv, DOI: 10.1080/10920277.2001.10596025
- Galula, D. (1964) *Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice*. Frederick A. Praeger, New York

- Gibson, E. (2015). "Kontrakteur van sa sterf in gevegte teen book haram." Netwerk24.com, March 11, 2015.
- Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (2018). "I Will Never Go Back to School" The Impact of Attacks on Education for Nigerian Women and Girls, New York (Author)
- Global Terrorism Index (2015) "Institute for Economics and Peace" 1-111.
- Global Terrorism Index (2016) "Institute for Economics and Peace" 1-101.
- Goldenberg, S (1993). Analytic Induction Revisited. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, 18(2), 161- 176
doi:10.2307/3341256
- Haas, P. M (1992) "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," *International Organization* 46/1 (Winter 1992) p.4.
- Hentz, J. J. (2018) "The multidimensional nature of the Boko Haram conflict," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 29:5-6, 839-862, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1519295
- Hill, P (2008). "The Varangian Guard: An Elite Military Unit in the Byzantine Empire," *War in History*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 461-479.)
- Holmqvist, C. (2005) "Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 9, January 2005.
- Homel, P. & Masson, N. (2016). "Partnerships for human security in fragile contexts: where community safety and security sector reform intersect," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 70:3, 311-327, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2015.1126803
- Howard, M (1987). *The Rise and Fall of the State: The Military Revolution and Political Change*, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 102, no. 1, pp. 1-20.
- Humanitarian Country Team (2018) "Humanitarian Response Strategy-Nigeria," December 2018. (Author)
- Hussain, W., Spady, W. G., Khan S. Z., Khawaja, B. A., Naqash, T. & Conner L. (2021). "Impact Evaluations of Engineering Programs Using Abet Student Outcomes" *IEEE Access*, Vol. 9, DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3066921
- Huntington, S. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Belknap Press.
- Hyett, N., Kenny, A. & Dickson-Swift, V. (2014). "Methodology or method? A critical review of qualitative case study reports," *International Journal of Qualitative Studies on Health and Well-being*, 9:1, DOI: 10.3402/qhw.v9.23606
- Ikpe, E (2017). "Counting the development costs of the conflict in NorthEastern Nigeria: the economic impact of the Boko Haram-led insurgency," *Conflict*,

Security & Development, 17:5, 381-409, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2017.1371987

- Institute for Economics and Peace (2015). "Global Terrorism Index 2015 measuring an understanding the impact of terrorism," Sydney: Institute of Economics and Peace Retrieved from <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>.
- International Crisis Group (2006). "The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria's Delta Unrest," International Crisis Group, Africa Report, No.115, August.
- Isaacs, D. (2003). Islam in Nigeria: Simmering tensions. BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3155279.stm>
- Isenberg, D (2007) "A government in search of cover: Private military companies in Iraq" in Chesterman, Simon and Chia Lehnardt, 2007: From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.82-94.
- Isima, J. (2007) "Regulating the Private Security Sector: An Imperative for Security Sector Governance in Africa," Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol.5, No1, May.
- Isma'ila, Y., & Madu, A. Y. (2016). Democratic Transition in Nigeria: Towards Understanding the Disguise of International Dynamics Challenging the Fourth Republic Consolidation. In & B. Mohamad (Ed.), Challenge of Ensuring Research Rigor in Soft Sciences, vol 14. European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences (pp. 289-295). Future Academy. <https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2016.08.41>
- Iwuoha, V.C (2020) 'Fake News' and 'Half-truths' in the Framings of Boko Haram Narrative: Implications on International Counterterrorism Responses, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 22:2, 82-103, DOZZI: 10.1080/23800992.2020.1771972
- Jacob, Z. (2019). "Boko Haram's Factional Feuds: Internal Extremism and External Interventions." Terrorism and Political Violence, (), 1-33. doi:10.1080/09546553.2019.1566127
- Jones, C. (2006). "Private Military Companies as 'Epistemic Communities'", Civil Wars, 8:3-4, 355-372, DOI: 10.1080/13698240601060660Kálmán, J. (2014). "The International Regulation of Private Security Providers - A Brief Analysis. In the book: Legal Studies on Contemporary Hungarian Legal System" (pp.148-173) Universitas-Győr Kft: Hungary
- Kangdim, D. M., Yorgancioglu, C., Bulus, K. I., Muazu, A. Y., & Danladi, S. K. (2022). The Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: A Multi-Sectoral Analysis. SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, 31(1), 157-172. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.1054025>
- Karagiannis, E. (2021). Russian Surrogate Warfare in Ukraine and Syria:

- Understanding the Utility of Militias and Private Military Companies. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 23(4), 549-565. DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2021.1888603.
- Kees, A. (2011): "Regulation of Private Military Companies," *Goettingen Journal of International Law*, Vol. 3. No. 1. Page numbers?
- Kinsey, C & Krieg, A (2021) Assembling a Force to Defeat Boko Haram: How Nigeria Integrated the Market into its Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Defense & Security Analysis*, 37:2, 232-249, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2021.1919356
- Kinsey, C (2005) "Challenging international law: a dilemma of private security companies. *Conflict, Security & Development*." 5. 269-293. DOI: 10.1080/14678800500344515
- Kinsey, C (2006). "Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies," Routledge, London.
- Kinsey, C (2007). "Problematizing the Role of Private Security Companies in Small Wars," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 18:4, 584-614, DOI: 10.1080/09592310701778472
- Kinsey, C. (2005) "Regulation and Control of Private Military Companies: the Legislative Dimension." *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 26, No. 1, April 2005, pp. 84-102.
- Krahmann, E. (2007). "Transitional States in Search of Support: Private Military Companies and Security Sector Reform" in *Chesterman, Simon and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), 2007: From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 94-114.
- Krathwohl, D. R. (1956). "Taxonomy of Education Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals: Handbook 2," *Affective Domain*. New York: David McKay
- Kulungu M (2021) "The Significance Role of Community Engagement and Soft Power in Countering Boko Haram in Sub-Saharan Africa." *J Def Stud Resource Manage* 9:1.
- Kwaja, C. M. A (2014) "Private Military/Security Companies, Privatisation of Violence and National Security: Implications for Democratic Governance in Nigeria," Working Paper, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) Available http://www.academia.edu/11956434/PRIVATE_SECURITY_COMPANIES_AND_NATIONAL_SECURITY_IN_NIGERIA (accessed November 17, 2022)
- Leander, A. (2005) "The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42, no. 5, pp. 605-622.
- Leander, A. (2006). "Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the

Legitimate Use of Force,” Rome: Centro Militaire di Studi Strategici.

- Leander, A. (2007) “Regulating the role of private military companies in shaping security and politics” in Chesterman, Simon and Chia Lehnardt, 2007: *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 49-67.
- Lekunze, M. (2019). “Security as an Emergent Property of a Complex Adaptive System.” *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 8(1): 6, pp. 1–17. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.700>
- Lind, G. (2012). “Private Security Providers, Past and Future, T. Mandrup (Ed.), *Privatisation of Security: The Concept, its History and its Contemporary Application* (s. 15-38). Royal Danish Defence College.
- Lubeck, M. P. et.al (2007) “Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the Security of Nigerian Democracy,” *International Policy Report*, Washington, DC: Centre for International Policy
- Mahmood, O. S. & Ani, N. C. (2018) “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram,” ISS Research report, Institute for Security Studies," Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/2018-07-06-research-report-2.pdf
- Mandel, R (2002) “Armies without States: The Privatization of Security.” Lynne Reinner: Boulder CO
- Mandel, R. (2002). “Without States: The Privatization of Security. Boulder: Lynne Reinner
- Mandrup, T. (2012). “Privatisation of Security: The Concept, its History, and its Contemporary Application,” *Conference Proceedings*, Mandrup (Ed.) Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College.
- Markovic, V. (2019). “Suicide Squad: Boko Haram’s use of the female suicide bomber.” *Women & Criminal Justice*, DOI:10.1080/08974454.2019.1629153
- Mickler, D., Suleiman, M. D. & Maiangwa, B (2019). “Weak State”, *Regional Power, Global Player: Nigeria and the Response to Boko Haram*, *African Security*, 12:3-4, 272-299, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2019.1667052
- Milliman, J. & Landon-Murray, M. (2020) *City council, and national security: oversight of local counterterrorism and security intelligence*, *Intelligence and National Security*, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2020.1837450
- Mockler, A. (1969). “The Mercenaries” London, MacDonald
- Moore, S. R. (2007). *The Basics of Counterinsurgency*. *Small Wars Journal*, 1-24.
- Münkler, H. (2005). “The New Wars.” Translated by Patrick Camiller. Polity Press: Cambridge and Malden.
- Murphy, J. (2015). “Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 3): Tactics Used to Destroy Boko

- Haram”. SOFREP, 4 July. <https://sofrep.com/40633/eeben-barlow-speaks-pt-3-tactics-used-destroy-boko-haram/> (accessed 6 December 2023)
- Murphy, J. (2020) “Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 1): PMC and Nigerian Strike Force Devastates Boko Haram”. SOFREP, May 23, 2022 <https://sofrep.com/news/eeben-barlow-south-african-pmc-devestates-boko-haram-pt1/> (accessed November 17, 2022)
- Nebolsina, M. (2012) “Principles for the Legal Regulation of PMSCs and Prospects for the new UN Convention,” Chapter in T. Mandrup (Ed.), *Privatisation of Security: The Concept, its History and its Contemporary Application* (s. 15-38). Royal Danish Defence College.
- Nicolle, D. (1988). "The Free Companies: The Emergence of the First Mercenary Armies in Europe," *Military History*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 32-38.
- Nicolle, D. (1990). "The Swiss Pike: Its Role in the Development of Modern Military Tactics," *Military History*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 32-38.
- Nielsen, L. B. (2016) “Private Military Companies in Africa – the case of STTEP in Nigeria.” *Journal of World Development Studies*, Vol 2 (No 2), December 2016, Gombe State University, Nigeria.
- Nnorom, K. (2021). “Boko Haram and Rising Developmental Crises in Nigeria: Overview and Sociological Implications,” *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity*, 16:1, 82-99, DOI: 10.1080/18186874.2021.1957696
- Nossal, K. R. (2001). “Global Governance and National Interests: The Regulation of Transnational Security Corporations in the Post-Cold War Era.” *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, 2 (2001), pp. 459-76
- Nwankpa, M. (2017). “Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for Boko Haram?” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 9:2, 106-124, DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2016.1189445
- Obamamoye, B. F. (2018). “Navigating the Enigma of Negotiating with a Jihadist Terrorist Group,” *African Security*, 11:4, 397-417, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2018.1560973
- Obiora, L. A. (2005). “Nigeria: Political Transition and the Complexities of Gender Empowerment,” United Nation Report.
- Oginni, S. O., Opoku, M. P. & Nketsia, W (2022). “Crisis at the intersection of four countries: healthcare access for displaced persons in the Lake Chad Basin region,” *Ethnicity & Health*, 27:7, 1698-1717, DOI: 10.1080/13557858.2021.1947471
- Ogunjowo, H. (2021) “Obasanjo, Nation Building and the Commonwealth,” *Humanus Discourse* Vol. 1. No.2.2021, ISSN 2787-0308
- Ojo, E. O (2010). “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Extra-Judicial State,” *Journal of*

- Ojo, J. S (2020). Governing “Ungoverned Spaces” in the Foliage of Conspiracy: Toward (Re)ordering Terrorism, from Boko Haram Insurgency, Fulani Militancy to Banditry in Northern Nigeria, *African Security*, 13:1, 77-110, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2020.1731109
- Okoli, A. C. & Azom, S. N. (2019). “Boko Haram insurgency and gendered victimhood: women as corporal victims and objects of war,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 30:6-7, 1214-1232, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2019.1650473
- Okolie-Osemene, J & Okolie-Osemene. R. I. (2019). “Nigerian women and the trends of kidnapping in the era of Boko Haram insurgency: pattern and evolution.” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol.30, no.6-7, pp. 1151-1168.
- Olaniyan, A. & Asuelime, L (2014). Boko Haram Insurgency and the Widening of Cleavages in Nigeria, *African Security*, 7:2, 91-109, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2014.909246
- Olojo, A. E. (2017). “Resistance through Islamic clerics against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria,” *African Security Review*, 26:3, 308-324, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2017.1294092
- Oluwaniyi, O. O (2021). “Why are women victims or perpetrators in Nigeria’s Boko Haram? Recruitment, roles, and implications,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 39:3, 454-469, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2020.1849580
- Omoruyi, O. (2000). “Nigeria-US Pact: Recipe for Danger.” In *The News*. October 2, 2000, p. 60.
- Onapajo, H & Usman, A. A. (2015). “Fuelling the Flames: Boko Haram and Deteriorating Christian–Muslim Relations in Nigeria,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 35:1, 106-122, DOI: 10.1080/13602004.2015.1007667
- Onapajo, H. (2020). “Children in Boko Haram Conflict: The Neglected Facet of a Decade of Terror in Nigeria,” *African Security*, 13:2, 195-211, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2020.1770919
- Onuoha, F. C. (2010). The Islamist challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis explained. *African Security Review*, 19(2), 54–67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2010.503061>
- Onuoha, F. C. & George, T. A. (2016) “The Abuja bombings: Boko Haram's reaction to President Buhari's actions,” *African Security Review*, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1156878
- Onuoha, F.C., Okafor, J.C., Femi-Adedayo, O.O. (2021). “Nigeria: Militancy, Insurgency and the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.” In Tar, U.A., Onwurah, C.P. (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of Small Arms and Conflicts in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62183-4_37

- Oriola, T. B (2016): “Unwilling Cocoons”: Boko Haram's War Against Women, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1177998
- Oriola T. B. & Akinola, O. (2017). “Ideational dimensions of the Boko Haram phenomenon,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2017.1338053
- Paasche, T. F. (2012). “The governance of security in the revanchist city-The case of Cape Town.” University of Plymouth.
- Pantucci, R., & Jespersen, S. (2015). “From Boko Haram to Ansaru: The evolution of Nigerian Jihad. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),” Occasional Paper. Retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201504_op_from_boko_haram_to_ansaru.pdf (accessed January 3, 2023)
- Parse, H. (1935). *Mercenaries in Hellenistic Times - G. T. Griffith : The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*. Pp. x 340. Cambridge: University Press, 1935. Cloth, 16s. *The Classical Review*, 49(4), 136-136. doi:10.1017/S0009840X00068013
- Percy, S. (2006) “Regulating the Private Security Industry.” Adelphi Paper 384, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge: Abingdon.
- Percy, S. (2009). “Private Security Companies and Civil Wars,” *Civil Wars*, 11:1, 57-74, DOI: 10.1080/13698240802407041
- Percy, S.V. (2007). “Mercenaries.” Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Pérouse de Montclos, M. (2018). “The only good jihadist is a dead jihadist’: Boko Haram and de-radicalization around Lake Chad,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 29:5-6, 863-885, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1519297
- Perrin, B. (2012). “Mind the gap: lacunae in the international legal framework governing private military and security companies.” *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 31(3), 213–232. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2012.737170>
- Prenzler, T. (2013). “Outsourcing of Policing Tasks: Scope and Prospects”. Report to the Australian Security Industry Association Limited. Sydney: Australian Security Industry Association Limited.
- Rasahugan, V. P & Khalil, S. (2021): Systematic literature review on private security governance by government, *Journal of Applied Security Research*, DOI: 10.1080/19361610.2021.1883398
- Schalock, R. L (2007). “Outcome-Based Evaluation” Kluwer Academic Publishers, New York
- Schreier, F. & Caparini, M. (2005) “Privatising Security: Law, Practice, and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies.” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper No. 6.
- Schroeder, U. C., Chappuis, F., & Kocak, D. (2013). *Security Sector Reform from a Policy Transfer Perspective: A Comparative Study of International*

Interventions in the Palestinian Territories, Liberia and Timor-Leste. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 7(3), 381–401.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2013.770255>

Scott, M.C (2020). “Boko Haram, bandits, and slave-raiders: identities and violence in a Central African borderland.” *Canadian Journal of African Studies Revue canadienne des Études africaines*, (), 1–17.
doi:10.1080/00083968.2019.1700142

Securitas AB (2006) “Securitas Annual Report 2006,” Stockholm: Securitas AB, Available at. <https://www.securitas.com/globalassets/com/press-releases-attachments/wkr000185.pdf> (Viewed November 18, 2022)

Shearer, D. (1998). “Private Armies and Military Interventions.” London: Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 316, 1998.

Shemella, P. (2011). ‘Tools and Strategies for Combating Terrorism,’ in Shemella, P. (eds) *Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 131–147.

Shigenoi, K., & Maekawa, W. (2022). Evaluating the effect of military intervention on rebel governance in terms of disaggregated human security. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 33(6), 1059-1084.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2064701>

Singer, P. W. (2003). “Corporate Warriors.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Singer, P. W. (2007). “Corporate warriors: The rise of the private military industry.” Cornell University Press.

Singer, P.W (2003). “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.” Cornell University Press: New York and London.

Singer, W. P. (2008). “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry,” London: Cornell University Press.

Solanke, B. L (2018). “Factors associated with use of maternal healthcare services during the Boko Haram,” *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, 34:3, 158-184, DOI: 10.1080/13623699.2018.1511358

STTEP International (2009). “Major Projects to Date,” Official Website. https://www.sttepi.com/major_projects.html (accessed on 6 January 2023)

Tawhid, R., Braun, E. Cartwright, N., Alhaj, M. Mussbacher, G. Shamsaei, A., Amyot, D., Behnam, S.A., Richards, G. (2012). "Towards outcome-based regulatory compliance in aviation security," 20th IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE), 2012, pp. 267-272, DOI: 10.1109/RE.2012.6345813.

Technavio (2022). “Private Security Services Market by End-user, Service, and Geography - Forecast and Analysis 2022-2026,” Available at <https://www.technavio.com/report/private-security-services-market-size->

industry-analysis (accessed 18 November, 2022)

- The Guardian (2015). "Hundreds dead as Boko Haram clashes with Nigerian army in Maiduguri." The Guardian. 26 January 2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/hundreds-dead-as-boko-haram-clashes-with-nigerian-army-in-maiduguri> . (Accessed February 16, 2023)
- The Telegraph (2023, June 24). Live Russia coup latest: Wagner boss will move to Belarus under deal to withdraw troops. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/24/russia-ukraine-coup-wagner-kremlin-yevgeny-prigozhin/>
- ThisDayLive (2015, February 20). Jonathan: National confab report will bring real change. <https://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/-national-confab-report-will-bring-real-change-/202406/>
- Thurston, A. (2016) "The disease is unbelief: Boko Haram's religious and political world," The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, No. 22, January 2016, Brookings: Center for Middle East Policy. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/brookings-analysis-paper_alex_thurston_final_web.pdf (accessed December 7, 2022)
- Tonkin, H. (2011). "State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Trochim W. M. K. & Donnelly J. P. (2007). Research methods knowledge base (3rd Ed.). Thomson Custom Pub.
- Tyler, R. W. (1950). "Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction." Illinois: Chicago University Press.
- Ugwueze, M. I. & Onuoha, F. C. (2020). "Hard Versus Soft Measures to Security: Explaining the Failure of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria," Journal of Applied Security Research, 15:4, 547-567, DOI: 10.1080/19361610.2020.1811936
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019). "Nigeria emergency." October 31 Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/en-my/nigeria-emergency.html>.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (2017). Making schools safer and students more confident. Retrieved June 23, 2023, from https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/media_11644.html
- Varin C (2018) "Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on Nigeria's counterinsurgency against Boko Haram," African Security Review, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2018.1489863
- Varin, C. (2014). "Mercenaries, Hybrid Armies and National Security: Private Soldiers and the State in the 21st Century." London: Routledge, 2014.

- Varin, C. (2016). "Boko Haram and the War on Terror." Santa Barbara: Praeger Security
- Verbruggen, J.F. (1977) "The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340," Netherlands: North-Holland Publishing Company
- Verkuil, P. R. (2007). "Outsourcing Sovereignty," Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Virginia, C. (2015). "The Regional Problem of Boko Haram." *Survival*, 57(4), 109–117. doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1068560
- Weber, M. (1964). "The Theory of Social and Economic Organization." New York: The Free Press.
- Westermeyer, G. (2013). "The impact of private actors on security governance: An analysis based on German ISR Capabilities for ISAF." Springer Science & Business Media.
- Whyte, D. (2003). "Lethal Regulation: State-Corporate Crime and the United Kingdom Government's New Mercenaries." *Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 30, no. 4, December 2003, pp. 575-600.
- Williams, A. & Istifanus, J. (2017). "Boko Haram Insurgency: A Threat to the Girl-Child's Access to Education in the Northeast of Nigeria." *European Journal of Education Studies*, Volume 3, Issue 12. ISSN: 2501 - 1111 ISSN-L: 2501 – 1111 Available online at: www.oapub.org/edu
- World Population Review (2023). *Nigeria Population 2023 (Live)*. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population>
- Yin, R. K (2018). *Case study research and applications: design and methods*, Los Angeles: Sage
- Zarate, J.C. (1998). "The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder." *Stanford Journal of International Law*, Vol. 34, pp. 75-156.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Publications

1. Bamigboye, O. M. (2023). “Contested Territory and “Burdened” Communities: Biafra’s Secession.” In K.W. Gray [Ed.] Global Encyclopedia of Territorial Rights, Springer Cham, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68846-6> (Forthcoming)
2. Bamigboye, O. M. (2023). “Nigeria: Inequality of Income Distribution and Hopes for Democratic Consolidation” (April 2023) CRC Press Taylor Francis for A. Alola, V. B. Festus, U. Alola [Ed.] Economic Trends and Sustainable Environmental Assessment (Paper Call: Economic Trends and Sustainable Environmental Assessment.

3. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358211881_Economic_Trends_and_Sustainable_Environmental_Assessment_\(Forthcoming\)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358211881_Economic_Trends_and_Sustainable_Environmental_Assessment_(Forthcoming))
4. Bamigboye, O. M. (2022). "Does Outsourcing Security to Private Security Companies Impact International Security and Counterterrorism?" *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research (AJoTIR)*, Volume 3, Number 2, December 2022, Pp 5-31. ISSN 2732-4990 (Print) ISSN 2732-5008 (Online) DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31920/2732-5008/2022/v3n2a1>
5. Bamigboye, O. M. (2022). "Article Review: Şener Aktürk, "Toward a Turkish-Russian Axis? Conflicts in Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, and Cooperation Over Nuclear Energy," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2014), Pp. 13-22. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. Available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4274791>
6. Bamigboye, O. M. (2022) "Chapter Review: Stephen Larrabe and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey, and the United States," *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, pp. 159-184. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4274765>
7. Bamigboye, O. M. (2020). "Examining the Effects of Globalization on International Relations," *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3661156>
8. Bamigboye, O. M (2016). Arbitration Law and Practice: A Principled Approach to the Award of Cost in Commercial Arbitration, *The Jurist, Essays in Honour of Hon. Justice Raliat Elelu-Habeeb(Rtd)*, *Journal of the Law Students' Society, University of Ilorin*, Vol.21, June 2016. (Online version available in SSRN Electronic Journal. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858817>)
9. Bamigboye, O.M (2015) 'The True Exception to the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle: Statutory Derivative Action Revisited,' *The Arbitrator*, Vol.2, *Journal of the Law Students Society, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba*, December 2015 (Online version available in SSRN Electronic Journal at <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863851>)

10. Bamigboye, O.M (2015) ‘Arbitration Law and Practice: Does National Court Involvement Undermine the Arbitration Processes?’ The Lord Justice Journal, Vol.6, Essays in Honour of Chief Mrs. Folake Solanke SAN, Journal of the Law Students’ Society, University of Ibadan. October 2015. (Online version available in SSRN Electronic Journal at <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858812>)
11. Bamigboye, O.M (2015) A Critical Review of the Role of Nigerian Courts in Commercial Arbitration, University of Ibadan (Honors Research)
12. Bamigboye, O.M (2014) (Editor-in-Chief) The Lord Justice Journal, Vol.5, Essays in Honour of Judge Bola Ajibola SAN.
13. Bamigboye, O.M (2011) ‘What is wrong with the Nigerian Evidence Act?’ Black on White Magazine, Vol.1, Law Press Organization, University of Ibadan.