Hierarchical secure key assignment scheme

dc.authorid0000-0003-2865-6370
dc.authorid0000-0002-4572-4016
dc.authorid0000-0002-9892-8717
dc.authorid0000-0001-8130-8178
dc.contributor.authorÇeliktaş, Barışen_US
dc.contributor.authorÇelikbilek, İbrahimen_US
dc.contributor.authorGüzey, Süedaen_US
dc.contributor.authorÖzdemir, Enveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-02T08:13:05Z
dc.date.available2026-03-02T08:13:05Z
dc.date.issued2026-02-18
dc.departmentIşık Üniversitesi, Mühendislik ve Doğa Bilimleri Fakültesi, Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümüen_US
dc.departmentIşık University, Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences, Department of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.description.abstractThis work presents a novel hierarchical key assignment mechanism for access control, designed to be computationally lightweight and optimized for digital environments with structured access policies. By leveraging orthogonal projection and distributing a basis to each group, it enables flexible and efficient left-to-right and top-down access structures. The scheme ensures that parent groups can derive the secret keys of their child groups while preventing unauthorized reverse access. It is resilient against collusion attacks and privilege escalation, offering robust key recovery and indistinguishability properties. Moreover, it guarantees strong key indistinguishability under adversarial models and facilitates a secure rekeying process without reliance on a trusted third party. To demonstrate practical efficiency, we provide a full analytical complexity evaluation showing that key derivation requires at most ∂(n2i ) operations, where ni is the dimension of the assigned subspace. For typical deployment parameters used in the experiments, the total key material per user remains compact (≈ 3,072 bits), significantly smaller than well-known post-quantum schemes such as Dilithium-5 (38,912 bits). The storage requirement scales linearly with the number of groups (ck+1 bases for c groups with at most k members), ensuring that even large hierarchies remain lightweight. Our evaluation further shows that selective rekeying affects only the descendants of the modified group, resulting in communication overhead of ∂(m′λ) bits, where m′ is the number of affected users and λ is the key length. These results collectively highlight the scheme’s scalability, low storage footprint, and suitability for large access hierarchies.en_US
dc.description.versionPublisher's Versionen_US
dc.identifier.citationÇeliktaş, B., Çelikbilek, İ., Güzey, S. & Özdemir, E. (2026). Hierarchical secure key assignment scheme. PLOS One, 21(2), 1-37. doi:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0341637en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1371/journal.pone.0341637
dc.identifier.endpage37
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.pmid41706766
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-105030339007
dc.identifier.startpage1
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11729/7080
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0341637
dc.identifier.volume21
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ1
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakPubMeden_US
dc.institutionauthorÇeliktaş, Barışen_US
dc.institutionauthorid0000-0003-2865-6370
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.publisherPublic Library of Scienceen_US
dc.relation.ispartofPLOS Oneen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectAlgorithmsen_US
dc.subjectComputer securityen_US
dc.subjectHumansen_US
dc.subjectControlled studyen_US
dc.subjectOpen access publishingen_US
dc.titleHierarchical secure key assignment schemeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublicationen_US

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