Firing regulations and firm size in the developing world: evidence from differential enforcement
Yükleniyor...
Dosyalar
Tarih
2012-11
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Wiley-Blackwell
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
This paper examines how stringent de facto firing regulations affect firm size throughout the developing world. A large firm level dataset is used across 63 countries and within country variation in the enforcement of the labor codes in countries with very different de jure firing regulations is explored. The findings strongly suggest that firms facing a stricter enforcement of firing regulations are on average smaller. This finding is interpreted as supportive of the fact that more stringent de facto firing regulations tend to reduce average employment. Robust evidence is found that this effect is stronger for more labor intensive manufacturing firms, especially those operating in low-technology sectors. Evidence also shows that this negative correlation does not hold in countries with a very weak rule of law.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Labor regulation, Employment, Employment protection legislation, Employment protection, Temporary contracts, Developing world, Firm size, Labor policy, Law enforcement, Manufacturing, Regulatory framework
Kaynak
Review of Development Economics
WoS Q Değeri
Q2
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
16
Sayı
4
SI
SI
Künye
Almeida, R. K. & Susanlı, Z. B. (2012). Firing regulations and firm size in the developing world: Evidence from differential enforcement. Review of Development Economics, 16(4), 540-558. doi:10.1111/rode.12003
