Is ingroup favoritism contingent on the expectation of reciprocity from ingroup members?: The case of reputation manipulation

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dc.authorid0000-0002-2399-4349
dc.authorid0000-0002-6601-1023
dc.contributor.authorKoloğlugil, Serhaten_US
dc.contributor.authorTekeş, Burcuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-20T03:52:31Z
dc.date.available2020-02-20T03:52:31Z
dc.date.issued2021-12
dc.departmentIşık Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Ekonomi (İktisat) Bölümüen_US
dc.departmentIşık University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe use a game of cooperation with minimal groups to test whether ingroup favoritism can be explained by the expectation of reciprocity from ingroup members. To do this, we first manipulate participants’ level expected cooperation from ingroup and outgroup partners by letting them play the game with different partners having different (high or low) cooperative reputations. We then analyze how these expectations affect ingroup bias in the game across different reputation conditions. We find that even if subjects expect the same level of cooperation from ingroup and outgroup partners with high reputation, they still cooperate more with the former than the latter. This contradicts the reciprocity hypothesis in the literature which explains intergroup discrimination solely in reference to differential reciprocal expectations. But, against ingroup and outgroup partners with low cooperative reputation, subjects’ level of cooperation almost exactly parallel their reciprocal expectations. This result is in line with the reciprocity hypothesis. We explain these findings by arguing that both reciprocal expectations and social identity play their parts in the emergence of ingroup favoritism, but that their relative strengths may depend on the interaction with other contextual factors. We also argue in favor of further experimental research as to how reciprocity and social identity interact with such third factors as partner’s reputation in different games of social exchange.en_US
dc.description.versionPublisher's Versionen_US
dc.identifier.citationKoloğlugil, S. & Tekeş, B. (2021). Is ingroup favoritism contingent on the expectation of reciprocity from ingroup members?: The case of reputation manipulation. Current Psychology, 40(12), 5899-5908. doi:10.1007/s12144-019-00529-xen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s12144-019-00529-x
dc.identifier.endpage5908
dc.identifier.issn1046-1310
dc.identifier.issn1936-4733
dc.identifier.issue12
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85075250132
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2
dc.identifier.startpage5899
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11729/2257
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12144-019-00529-x
dc.identifier.volume40
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000574653700002
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakSocial Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)en_US
dc.institutionauthorKoloğlugil, Serhaten_US
dc.institutionauthorid0000-0002-2399-4349
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.peerreviewedYesen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofCurrent Psychologyen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectCooperative reputationen_US
dc.subjectIngroup favoritismen_US
dc.subjectIntergroup relationsen_US
dc.subjectReciprocityen_US
dc.subjectResearchen_US
dc.subjectSocial identificationen_US
dc.subjectSocial identityen_US
dc.titleIs ingroup favoritism contingent on the expectation of reciprocity from ingroup members?: The case of reputation manipulationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication

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