Turkey’s military victory over the PKK and its failure to end the PKK insurgency
Yükleniyor...
Tarih
2015-09-03
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Routledge journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
This article explores the major reasons why Turkey could not end the PKK insurgency despite its military defeat in the late 1990s. It argues that Turkish governments have failed to sufficiently address two key aspects of their low-intensity conflict with the PKK, namely the fact that the PKK is not just a group of armed militants, but rather a complex insurgent organization and that it appeals to a large number of Kurds. Turkey's inability to definitively quell the PKK insurgency raises significant questions regarding the justification and effectiveness of the use of military force in dealing with insurgencies.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Area studies, Rebellions, Kurds, Terrorism, Militia groups, Military policy
Kaynak
Middle Eastern Studies
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
51
Sayı
5
Künye
Kayhan Pusane, Ö. (2015). Turkey's military victory over the PKK and its failure to end the PKK insurgency. Middle Eastern Studies, 51(5), 727-741. doi:10.1080/00263206.2014.979801
