Turkey’s military victory over the PKK and its failure to end the PKK insurgency

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Tarih

2015-09-03

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Yayıncı

Routledge journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd

Erişim Hakkı

info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess

Araştırma projeleri

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Özet

This article explores the major reasons why Turkey could not end the PKK insurgency despite its military defeat in the late 1990s. It argues that Turkish governments have failed to sufficiently address two key aspects of their low-intensity conflict with the PKK, namely the fact that the PKK is not just a group of armed militants, but rather a complex insurgent organization and that it appeals to a large number of Kurds. Turkey's inability to definitively quell the PKK insurgency raises significant questions regarding the justification and effectiveness of the use of military force in dealing with insurgencies.

Açıklama

Anahtar Kelimeler

Area studies, Rebellions, Kurds, Terrorism, Militia groups, Military policy

Kaynak

Middle Eastern Studies

WoS Q Değeri

Q4
Q4

Scopus Q Değeri

Q2

Cilt

51

Sayı

5

Künye

Kayhan Pusane, Ö. (2015). Turkey's military victory over the PKK and its failure to end the PKK insurgency. Middle Eastern Studies, 51(5), 727-741. doi:10.1080/00263206.2014.979801