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Yayın A threefold empirical analysis of the relationship between regional income inequality and water equity using Tapio decoupling model, WPAT equation, and the local dissimilarity index: evidence from Bulgaria(Springer-Verlag GmbH, 2021-01) Taşbaşı, AslıThis study utilizes a threefold empirical analysis in order to examine the relationship between income and water equity in Bulgaria, the fastest shrinking country in the world in terms of population, and the most unequal member of the EU in terms of regional income distribution. First, in line with this goal, the income elasticity of regional water demand in the country is calculated using the Tapio decoupling model. Second, the WPAT equation which measures the weighted impacts of population, per capita income and intensity on water demand, is utilized. And finally, using the local dissimilarity index, spatial differences in access to water by region are measured. Underscoring the essence of regional level analyses based on specific decomposed subgroups, findings are thus compatible with the economic and demographic characteristics of the regions handled in the study. In the northern regions where income and population levels are relatively low, during periods when income and water demand both increase, the rise in water demand is usually higher than the increase in income; conversely, when income decreases, the water demand also falls. The effect of population dominates the changes in water demand in the northern regions, with the exception of the Northwestern Region, where water intensity is the leading factor, possibly because the Balkans’ largest nuclear power plant is located in the region. In the southern regions where income is higher, income has been the most important determinant of water demand, particularly in recent years.Yayın International trade and strategic behaviour: a game theoretical analysis of the trade dispute between Turkey and Russia(Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis, 2017) Taşbaşı, AslıStarting from the premise that strategic interactions between countries influence trade policy decisions, this paper is a first attempt at exploring the possible outcomes of a trade dispute between Turkey and Russia, assuming that Turkey can lodge a complaint about Russia's protectionist move to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Employing the course of events during the recent economic conflict between the two countries, the article models the stages of a trade game wherein players exhibit non-cooperative behaviour. It finds that Turkey reporting Russia to the DSB depends on the cost of the dispute, which represents both economic losses and losses that can be considered disadvantages in a broader sense. The results show that in trade relations where asymmetric interdependence is observed, if both parties mutually commit to an international organisation, binding regulations may provide strategy options that are otherwise infeasible for the disadvantaged player.
